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THE FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS OF 
ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT 
UNDER PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
CHARLES H. BROWER, II* 
INTRODUCTION 
When drafting international agreements, be they contracts or 
treaties, lawyers often provide for resolution of future disputes, usu-
ally by selecting arbitration or judicial settlement.1  For contracts 
likely to produce international commercial disputes among private 
parties, the modern shift from litigation to arbitration has assumed 
legendary proportions.  Unfortunately, that development has become 
so engrained in the public consciousness that many have ignored an 
important countertrend.  For controversies among states involving 
their exercise of sovereign powers and the application of public inter-
national law, dispute settlement has taken the opposite course: away 
from arbitration towards judicial settlement. 
Partially documenting the trajectory of dispute settlement involv-
ing states under public international law, one study has reviewed the 
decline of arbitration from 1945 through 1990.2  By contrast, no one 
 
* Tillar House Sabbatical Fellow, American Society of International Law; Visiting Fellow, Lau-
terpacht Research Centre for International Law, Cambridge University; Scholar-in-Residence, 
American University, Washington College of Law; Croft Associate Professor of International 
Law and Jessie D. Puckett, Jr. Lecturer-in-Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. 
 1. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (indicating that a “contrac-
tual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated . . . is . . . an 
almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential 
to any international business transaction”); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS 2 (1999) (indicating that it is “almost always advisable 
to include a contractual dispute resolution provision in any international contract,” which may 
“take the form of: (1) forum selection clauses, or (2) arbitration agreements”); Michael D. Mann 
& William P. Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of Securities Enforcement, 39 INT’L 
LAW. 937, 945 (2005) (opining that the “ability to decide in advance on an acceptable forum for 
disputes is . . . an essential element of international commercial transactions”). 
 2. Christine Gray & Benedict Kingsbury, Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-State 
Arbitration Since 1945, 1992 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 97. 
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has performed a corresponding analysis of the conscious effort to 
promote judicial settlement, launched in the nineteenth century, 
completed after the First World War, and reinforced after the Second 
World War.  Virtually no one has examined the goals the leaders of 
that movement sought to accomplish.  Likewise, virtually no one has 
compared that movement to the opposite direction taken by interna-
tional commercial disputes.  As a result, few people appreciate the 
substantially different functions and limits of arbitration and judicial 
settlement under private and public international law. 
Seeking to fill the gaps just identified, Part I briefly reviews the 
celebrated shift from litigation to arbitration for international com-
mercial disputes among private parties.  In so doing, it recounts the 
functions served by arbitration, the limits of that process, and the cor-
respondingly important role still played by judicial settlement in the 
resolution of international commercial disputes.  Turning to the reso-
lution of disputes among states under public international law, Part II 
documents four landmarks in the decisive shift from arbitration to-
wards judicial settlement, as well as the goals pursued or accom-
plished at each stage.  Having discussed the conscious promotion and 
apparent triumph of judicial settlement, Part III identifies the limits 
of that process and the correspondingly important role still played by 
arbitration for inter-state disputes having strong political dimensions.  
Building on the insights developed in Part III, Part IV seeks to ex-
plain the otherwise puzzling reluctance of states to embrace judicial 
settlement in the context of investment treaty disputes. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES: FROM 
LITIGATION TO ARBITRATION 
For international commercial disputes involving private parties, 
judicial settlement represents a logical starting point because most 
states possess experienced courts that have compulsory process over 
non-resident aliens,3 subject to permissive rules on personal jurisdic-
tion.4  During their formative years, many of those courts viewed arbi-
tration as unwelcome competition5 and, therefore, adopted doctrines 
 
 3. See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE  INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 4 (2003). 
 4. See JACK J. COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 18 (1997); Louise 
Ellen Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A Proposal to Resolve Conflicts of Jurisdiction 
and Multiple Proceedings, 26 INT’L LAW. 21, 23 (1992). 
 5. See S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2-3 (1924); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (1994); LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 18; Earl S. 
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calculated to arrest its development.6  As a result, judicial settlement 
remained the predominant form of adjudication for domestic and in-
ternational commercial disputes until well into the twentieth century.7 
Although courts have grown more favorably disposed to arbitra-
tion, judicial settlement remains the default venue for international 
commercial disputes in the sense that parties who wish binding deci-
sions and who have not provided otherwise must resolve their differ-
ences in municipal courts,8 often in two or more courts,9 with parallel 
submissions on jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, antisuit injunc-
tions, and even the merits.10  Given the awful financial consequences,11 
 
Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 141-42 
(1934). 
 6. For example, U.S. and English courts “refused to grant specific enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements, and permitted their revocation at any time.”  BORN, supra note 5, at 29.  Ac-
cording to Professor Carbonneau, such practices were “characteristic of most developed West-
ern legal systems” and were “manifestly intended to discourage party recourse to arbitration 
and to prevent the non-judicial framework from acquiring a legitimate institutional stature.”  
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263, 
266-67 (1988).  As a result, the courts “substantially limited the efficacy of arbitration as a 
means of commercial dispute resolution.”  BORN, supra note 5, at 29. 
 7. See BORN, supra note 5, at 17 (referring to the “apparent dearth of international com-
mercial arbitrations” following adoption of the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in 1923 
and adoption of the Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1927).  
See also CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS 41 (1996) (explaining that “[u]ntil  shortly after World War II, only occasional cases 
of international commercial arbitration existed outside the traditional fields of commodities and 
maritime arbitration in centers such as London or Hamburg”). 
 8. See BORN, supra note 1, at 3; ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 22 (4th ed. 2004). 
 9. See N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of Interna-
tional Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 601, 609 (2006) (explaining that “al-
though an action has been brought initially in the courts of country A, frequently one of the par-
ties to that action, whether the original plaintiff or defendant, will decide, for whatever reason 
of perceived advantage, to bring a subsequent action in the courts of country B”).  See also 
BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 17 (observing that international commercial litigation is often 
“conducted in the courts of several countries at the same time”). 
 10. One may define parallel proceedings as litigation of the same dispute by the same par-
ties in two or more courts.  See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 473 (3d ed. 1996) (emphasizing the overlap between parties and issues as a 
characteristic of parallel proceedings).  Thus, for parallel proceedings to occur, two or more 
courts must decide that they possess jurisdiction, often a subject raised during the first round of 
dispositive motions.  See Eugene J. Silva, Practical Views on Stemming the Tide of Foreign Plain-
tiffs and Concluding Mid-Atlantic Settlements, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 479, 482 (1993).  With jurisdic-
tion established in both fora, judges must then decide whether to terminate one of the actions 
based on principles of abstention (forum non conveniens or comity) or robust assertions of pri-
macy (antisuit injunctions).  See Teitz, supra note 4, at 31-38.  Assuming that both courts adhere 
to the general rule of allowing the parallel actions to continue, submissions on the merits will 
proceed in both venues until one court issues a final judgment, which may then serve to termi-
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the threat of decentralized judicial settlement serves as an incentive 
to conclude agreements expressly providing for dispute settlement in 
a single forum, either through litigation or arbitration.12 
Because they long served as the predominant venue for adjudica-
tion and, presumably, developed corresponding levels of expertise, 
one might understandably consider municipal courts as the natural 
choice for adjudicating commercial disputes.13  While the assumption 
may remain valid for domestic controversies,14 litigation in municipal 
courts entails serious drawbacks for parties to international transac-
tions.  For example, recourse to national judicial systems tends to 
confer strategic advantages on the local party.15  Aside from the threat 
of parochial bias, which remains a problem in the United States and 
elsewhere,16 hometown litigation allows local parties to engage their 
regular counsel,17 employ familiar procedures,18 present evidence and 
 
nate the remaining action as res judicata.  See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belg. World Air-
lines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984); BORN, supra, at 460, 472-73. Thus, if the parties pur-
sue every opportunity to avoid and to terminate parallel proceedings and if courts follow the 
general rule allowing parallel proceedings, one can easily imagine parallel submissions on juris-
diction, forum non conveniens, antisuit injunctions, and the merits. 
 11. See BORN, supra note 1, at 8; BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 20. 
 12. See BORN, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasizing the role of such contractual provisions in 
avoiding the threat of “parallel or multiplicitous litigation of the same dispute in two or more 
forums at the same time”). 
 13. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 22 (acknowledging the cogency of the view 
that “if parties wish a dispute to be decided in a binding way, they should normally have re-
course to the established courts of law”).  See also LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 4, 17 (opining 
that the “most obvious fora for all disputes are national courts,” which are “specifically estab-
lished by the state to . . . determine all forms of dispute”). 
 14. In “purely domestic” situations, disputing parties may be relatively more inclined to 
select litigation over arbitration.  See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 26.  However, even 
in this context, the choice may be “finely balanced” and may depend on the reputation of the 
particular court and the practices within specific industries.  See id. (emphasizing the need to 
consider the reputations of judicial systems); ANDREW TWEEDDALE & KEREN TWEEDDALE, 
ARBITRATION OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 39 (2005) (indicating that arbitration agreements 
have become standard for aviation agreements, construction contracts, engineering contracts, 
insurance contracts, and shipping contracts). 
 15. See BORN, supra note 1, at 6. 
 16. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 812, 821-22, 823, 829, 830, 833 
(2003) [hereinafter Loewen Final Award] (involving an investment treaty dispute based on Mis-
sissippi state court proceedings, which the arbitral tribunal called a “disgrace” because the trial 
judge “repeatedly” permitted “extensive irrelevant and highly prejudicial” references to a for-
eign investor’s race and nationality).  See also BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 22-23; LEW ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 5; WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 6, 8 (1995); 
Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State 
Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 138, 163 (2007). 
 17. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8 at 22.  See also BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 23. 
 18. See id. 
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arguments in their native languages,19 and appear before judges who 
share their business and legal culture.20  As a result, local parties may 
reap advantages bearing little relation to the merits of the case. 
While one might level the playing field by providing for litigation 
in a third state,21 that approach can lead to neutrality of the worst 
kind, placing the disputing parties in equally bad positions: denying 
them both the opportunity to engage their regular counsel, to employ 
familiar procedures, to use their native languages, or to appear before 
decision-makers accustomed to their business and legal cultures.  Fur-
thermore, the judicial procedures of third states may not be well de-
signed for international commercial disputes,22 the judges may lack 
relevant expertise,23 and their judgments will not enjoy worldwide en-
forcement in summary proceedings.24 
As practiced today, international commercial arbitration elimi-
nates many of the drawbacks associated with hometown litigation.25  
For example, while parties from developing states might complain 
about the supposedly Western orientation of major arbitration insti-
tutions,26 one probably cannot accuse them of the strong parochial bi-
ases often embedded in national judicial systems.  To the extent that 
parties from developing states remain concerned about the cultural 
orientation of major arbitration institutions, they may insist on ad hoc 
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, approved by 
the United Nations General Assembly,27 in which developing, non-
Western states enjoy a preponderant voice.  In addition, the increas-
 
 19. Id. 
 20. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 22. 
 21. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1972); BORN, supra note 1, 
at 3; BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 23; PARK, supra note 16, at 14. 
 22. BORN, supra note 1, at 9; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 22, 26. 
 23. BORN, supra note 1, at 9; LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 5; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra 
note 8, at 26. 
 24. As noted by most standard texts, there are few regional treaties and no global treaties 
requiring enforcement of foreign judgments.  BORN, supra note 1, at 13, 105-06; COE, supra note 
4, at 61; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 23.  Although the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law adopted a Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which would require 
enforcement of judgments rendered by courts selected by contractual agreement in interna-
tional commercial disputes, only one state has acceded to that instrument, which has not entered 
into force.  See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005), 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act= conventions.text&cid=98. 
 25. See PARK, supra note 16, at 15. 
 26. See BORN, supra note 5, at 7; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 196. 
 27. G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), available at 
http://www.uncitr-al.org.  See also BORN, supra note 1, at 56. 
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ing harmonization of international arbitration rules28 and laws29 means 
that all parties can reap the benefits of familiar procedures specifi-
cally designed for international commercial disputes.  Furthermore, 
those instruments generally allow parties to employ their regular 
counsel without regard to bar membership at the place of arbitra-
tion.30  Finally, the opportunity to appoint an arbitrator, and the New 
York Convention’s widespread ratification help to ensure that tribu-
nal members will have relevant expertise,31 that they will collectively 
appreciate the business and legal cultures of the disputing parties,32 
and that their awards can be enforced in summary proceedings under 
uniform standards from “Albania to Zimbabwe.”33  Thus, because it 
combines neutrality with high levels of convenience for both parties, 
and because it promotes finality through worldwide guarantees of en-
forcement,34 arbitration has eclipsed judicial settlement as the pre-
dominant means of adjudicating international commercial disputes.35 
Given the pronounced shift towards arbitration, one often for-
gets that the process has substantial limitations,36 including a con-
spicuous vulnerability to sabotage.37  Thus, because arbitration de-
pends on the consent of the parties,38 unwilling respondents may 
disrupt the process simply by withholding cooperation.  For example, 
they may not respond to demands for arbitration.39  They may contest 
 
 28. See JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (1999); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 47; TWEEDDALE & 
TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 39.  See also BORN, supra note 5, at 39. 
 29. TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 39.  See also BORN, supra note 5, at 37-
38. 
 30. LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 542; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 472. 
 31. BORN, supra note 1, at 9; LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 8; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra 
note 8, at 22. 
 32. See BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 84; LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 7. 
 33. LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 693-94.  See also COE, supra note 4, at 61 (emphasizing the 
convention’s “wide acceptance” and the consequent standardization of the “general approach 
taken to foreign arbitral awards by contracting states”). 
 34. See LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 6-7; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 22-23, 25-
26. 
 35. See BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 37, 38; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 1; 
TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 39. 
 36. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 26 (suggesting that the strong shift towards 
arbitration has resulted in fewer critical examinations of that processes). 
 37. See id. at 288 (observing that “delay and disruption became important issues in interna-
tional commercial arbitration” during the final two decades of the twentieth century). 
 38. TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 41. 
 39. BORN, supra note 5, at 184; BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 149. 
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the validity of arbitration agreements.40  They may refuse to appoint 
their own arbitrators.41  They may challenge the independence or im-
partiality of other tribunal members.42  They may object to the tribu-
nals’ jurisdiction over some or all components of the disputes.43  Fi-
nally, they may not voluntarily satisfy awards.44  Barring outside 
intervention, any one of these steps could obstruct the arbitral proc-
ess and transform it into a pointless exercise.  As a safeguard against 
that misfortune, however, modern arbitration statutes empower na-
tional courts to prevent collapse by enforcing arbitration agree-
ments,45 appointing arbitrators,46 deciding challenges,47 reviewing ju-
risdictional decisions,48 and enforcing awards.49 Thus, judicial 
assistance supplies the coercion needed to guarantee arbitration’s 
long-term viability as the preferred means of adjudicating interna-
tional commercial disputes.50 
II. DISPUTES AMONG STATES UNDER PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM ARBITRATION TO 
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT 
For inter-state disputes involving sovereign activities and the ap-
plication of public international law, arbitration represents a logical 
starting point in the sense that it preceded judicial settlement and re-
mained the normal means of adjudication until well into the twentieth 
 
 40. BORN, supra note 5, at 184. 
 41. BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 149. 
 42. BORN, supra note 5, at 67; BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 7, at 149. 
 43. BORN, supra note 5, at 382-83, 384. 
 44. See TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 407 (recognizing that an award “is 
no more than a piece of paper” that “does not guarantee payment from the other party”). 
 45. See, e.g., Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the U.N. Commission 
on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 40/72, art. 8, U.N. GAOR 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 
308, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Dec. 11, 1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].  See also 
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 331. 
 46. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 45, art. 11.  See also LEW ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 241-44; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 331. 
 47. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 45, art. 13(3).  See also LEW ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 310-13; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 331. 
 48. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 45, art. 16(3).  See also LEW ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 337-39; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 332. 
 49. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 45, art. 35.  See also REDFERN & 
HUNTER, supra note 8, at 349-56, 431, 432-34. 
 50. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 328 (emphasizing that arbitration remains 
“wholly dependent on the underlying support of the courts who alone have the power to rescue 
the system when one party seeks to sabotage it”). 
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century.51  Nevertheless, the modern history of inter-state adjudica-
tion reveals a steady shift from arbitration towards judicial settle-
ment.  In recounting this transition, one may identify four landmarks, 
each of which reflects the crystallization of a new stage: (1) the forma-
tion of quasi-diplomatic joint commissions under the Jay Treaty of 
1794; (2) the establishment of an independent and impartial tribunal 
to resolve the Alabama Claims in 1871; (3) the harmonization of pro-
cedural rules following inauguration of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration by the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907; and (4) the 
consistent development of substantive international law following es-
tablishment of a truly Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) and an International Court of Justice (ICJ) after the First and 
Second World Wars.52 
A. The Jay Treaty Commissions: The Quasi-Diplomatic Practice of 
Arbitration 
Virtually all writers trace the modern history of international tri-
bunals to the General Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion between the United States and Great Britain, commonly known 
as the Jay Treaty of November 19, 1794.53  Seeking to resolve a num-
 
 51. Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 919, 922 (1999); Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 102. 
 52. See MANLEY O. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE 3 (1944). 
 53. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116 
[hereinafter Jay Treaty].  See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 672 (6th ed. 2003); COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 32; THOMAS M. FRANCK, 
JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 13 (1986); WARREN F. KUEHL, SEEKING WORLD ORDER 23 
(1969); HOWARD N. MEYER, THE WORLD COURT IN ACTION 2 (2002); JACKSON H. RALSTON, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO, at vii, 191 (1929) [hereinafter 
RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO]; JACKSON H. RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, at xxvi (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter RALSTON, LAW AND 
PROCEDURE]; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 2 (6th ed., 
Terry D. Gill ed., 2003) [hereinafter ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT]; 1 JAMES BROWN SCOTT, 
THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 210, 224 (1909) [hereinafter SCOTT, 
THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES]; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 952 (5th ed. 
2003); Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribu-
nals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 118 (1998); Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 97; Mark 
W. Janis, The International Court, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 13, 14 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992); Richard B. Lillich, The Jay Treaty Commissions, 37 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 260, 261-62 (1963); John Bassett Moore, The Organization of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 497, 497-98 (1922); Robert Pietrowski, Evi-
dence in International Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT’L 373, 376 (2006); M.C.W. Pinto, The Prospects 
for International Arbitration: Inter-State Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: PAST AND 
PROSPECTS 63, 66 (A.H.A. Soons ed., 1990); Georg Schwarzenberger, Present-Day Relevance of 
the Jay Treaty Arbitrations, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 715, 715 (1978); Bette Shifman, The Per-
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ber of differences left outstanding after the War of Independence,54 
that instrument established three arbitral commissions,55 whose mem-
bership consisted exclusively of U.S. citizens and British subjects.56 
The first commission, established under Article V of the Jay 
Treaty, had the task of identifying the location of the St. Croix River, 
designated as the northeast boundary of the United States in the 
treaty ending the War of Independence.57  While the mandate appears 
relatively simple, the drafters of the earlier treaty lacked personal 
knowledge of that “largely unsurveyed” region,58 relied on an inaccu-
rate map,59 referred to the name of a river unknown to contemporary 
inhabitants of that region,60 and left no record by which one might 
have ascertained the river they intended to designate as the border of 
the United States.61  Notwithstanding the difficulties that it con-
fronted, the first commission had the fortune to reach a unanimous 
decision.62 
 
manent Court of Arbitration: An Overview, in THE HAGUE: LEGAL CAPITAL OF THE WORLD 
128, 128 (Peter J. van Krieken & David McKay eds., 2005); Stephen W. Schwebel, The Reality of 
International Adjudication and Arbitration, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 359, 363 
(2004); L. B. Sohn, International Arbitration in Historical Perspective: Past and Present, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTS, supra at 9, 11; Draft of a Memorandum 
Approved by U.S. Sec’y of State Philander C. Knox, proposing the Establishment of the Court 
of Arbitral Justice recommended by the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 (Nov. 25, 
1912) [hereinafter Knox Memorandum], reprinted in JAMES BROWN SCOTT, AN 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 6, 6 (1916) [hereinafter SCOTT, AN INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE]. 
 54. J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL FOX, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1 (1959); ROSENNE’S 
THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 2; Janis, supra note 53, at 14; Shifman, supra note 53, at 
128. 
 55. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 191. 
 56. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3; J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
89 (3d ed. 1998); ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 2; SCOTT, THE HAGUE 
PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 218-19; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 105. 
 57. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 563, at 116 (1922); 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND 
DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE  UNITED STATES HAS BEEN 
A PARTY 5-6 (1898); ROBERT C. MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND PROCEDURE 
42-45 (1911); RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 191; RALSTON, LAW AND 
PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvi; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, 
at 216; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 1; Lillich, supra note 53, at 266; Schwarzenberger, su-
pra note 53, at 720. 
 58. PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 26 (1971); MOORE, supra 
note 56, at 1-2; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 41. 
 59. MOORE, supra note 57, at 2; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 41. 
 60. MOORE, supra note 57, at 3; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 42. 
 61. MOORE, supra note 57, at 2, 24; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 41, 44. 
 62. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 191; 
SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 1; Pinto, supra note 53, at 66. 
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The second commission, established under Article VI, faced the 
task of resolving claims by British merchants for debts incurred by 
U.S. citizens,63 which remained outstanding due to legal impediments 
imposed by former colonies during the War of Independence.64  After 
the claims proved much larger than expected by the United States65 
and thus increased the stakes beyond a comfortable scale, doctrinal66 
and interpersonal67 quarrels broke out among commissioners, causing 
the American members to withdraw,68 thereby bringing a halt to the 
proceedings in July 1799.69  Three years later, the United States set-
tled the remaining claims of British merchants by treaty for 
$2,664,000.70 
The third arbitral commission, established under Article VII, 
faced the task of settling the claims of U.S. citizens for losses resulting 
from British detention or condemnation of ships and cargo bound for 
French ports during a period of armed conflict between Britain and 
France.71  During the course of its proceedings, the third commission 
confronted difficult questions regarding the scope of its jurisdiction72 
 
 63. MOORE, supra note 57, at 271-76; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 62. 
 64. RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 191; RALSTON, LAW AND 
PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvi; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, 
at 216; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 1-2; Lillich, supra note 53, at 270-71. 
 65. MOORE, supra note 57, at 286, 288. 
 66. Id. at 283-85, 287, 288-91.  See also MORRIS, supra note 57, at 62; Lillich, supra note 53, 
at 272-73. 
 67. MOORE, supra note 57, at 293; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 62-63; SCOTT, THE HAGUE 
PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 216-17; Lillich, supra note 53, at 274, 275; Pinto, supra 
note 53, at 67. 
 68. MOORE, supra note 57, at 292; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 192; 
Lillich, supra note 53, at 273-74. 
 69. MOORE, supra note 57, at 290-92; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 62; SIMPSON & FOX, supra 
note 54, at 2.  See also HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3; RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra 
note 53, at xxvi. 
 70. JESSUP, supra note 58, at 26; MOORE, supra note 57, at 298.  See also HUDSON, supra 
note 52, at 3; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 63; RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at 
xxvi; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 217; SIMPSON & FOX, supra 
note 54, at 2; David J. Bederman, The Glorious Past and Uncertain Future of International 
Claims Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 
53, at 161, 164; Lillich, supra note 53, at 274-75. 
 71. Jay Treaty, supra note 53, art. VII.  See also MOORE, supra note 57, at 299-310; 
MORRIS, supra note 57, at 60; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 192; 
RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvi; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 2; 
Lillich, supra note 53, at 276. 
 72. MOORE, supra note 57, at 324; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 61; Lillich, supra note 53, at 
277-78. 
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and the exhaustion of local remedies.73  On two occasions, withdrawal 
of the British commissioners forced the tribunal to suspend its pro-
ceedings.74  Despite these setbacks, the commission eventually re-
sumed its work75 and, in the course of eight years,76 rendered over 530 
awards in favor of U.S. claimants,77 who received some $11,650,000 in 
compensation.78 
The significance of the Jay Treaty commissions lies in their re-
vival of arbitration,79 which had fallen into disuse during at least one,80 
or more centuries,81 of European conflicts over religion, territory, and 
the consolidation of nation-states.82  Furthermore, departing from the 
tradition of arbitration by monarchs and ecclesiastical figures who 
 
 73. MOORE, supra note 57, at 332-33; Lillich, supra note 53, at 278-79. 
 74. MOORE, supra note 57, at 324, 337-39; Lillich, supra note 53, at 277-78, 279; Pinto, supra 
note 53, at 67. 
 75. MOORE, supra note 57, at 332, 339; Lillich, supra note 53, at 277-78, 279-80. 
 76. RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvi. 
 77. See HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3 (553 awards); MOORE, supra note 57, at 342-43 (553 
awards); Bederman, supra note 70, at 164, 167 (536 awards); Janis, supra note 53, at 14 (536 
awards). 
 78. JESSUP, supra note 58, at 25; MOORE, supra note 57, at 343-44; MORRIS, supra note 57, 
at 60-61; Lillich, supra note 53, at 280.  See also RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 
53, at xxvi (mentioning the award of “a net sum considerably in excess of $11,000,000”). 
 79. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3; KUEHL, supra note 53, at 23; 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS, at x (1929); MEYER, supra note 53, at 3; REDFERN & 
HUNTER, supra note 8, at 63; JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 47 (1927); SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 1; David D. Caron, 
War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the 1899 Peace Conference, 94 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 4, 9 (2000); Lillich, supra note 53, at 261; Moore, supra note 53, at 497-98; C.G. Roelofsen, 
“The Jay Treaty and All That”; Some Remarks on the Role of Arbitration in European Modern 
History and Its “Revival” in 1794, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTS, 
supra note 53, at 201, 201; Memorandum accompanying Letter from James Brown Scott, Direc-
tor, Division of International Law, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to H.E. Jonk-
heer J. Loudon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands (Jan. 12, 1914) [hereinafter Scott 
Memorandum], reprinted in SCOTT, AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 
25, 26. 
 80. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 
53, at 210; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 1. 
 81. MOORE, supra note 79, at x; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 14-15; MEYER, supra note 53, at 
3; Abi-Saab, supra note 51, at 921; Geoffrey Best, Peace Conferences and the Century of Total 
War: The 1899 Hague Conference and What Came After, 75 INT’L AFF. 619, 628 (1999); Moore, 
supra note 53, at 497; William L. Penfield, International Arbitration, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 330, 337 
(1907); Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 26 n.1. 
 82. See MOORE, supra note 79, at x; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 14.  See also REDFERN & 
HUNTER, supra note 8, at 63 (observing that arbitration “fell into disuse with the rise of the 
modern state”). 
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stated no reasons for their awards,83 the Jay Treaty afforded the first 
prominent example of arbitration by collegial tribunals issuing rea-
soned awards based on the application of legal principles.84  Finally, 
the Jay Treaty extended the use of arbitration beyond the traditional 
scope of territorial disputes to include the resolution of numerous 
claims involving injuries to aliens under the law of state responsibil-
ity.85 
While not detracting from their significance, the Jay Treaty arbi-
trations also illustrate the ways in which the membership of the com-
missions and their rules of procedure led to a combination of legal 
proceedings and diplomatic negotiations, with a heavy emphasis on 
the latter.  For example, one should recall that the Jay Treaty led to 
establishment of commissions drawn exclusively from citizens of the 
disputing parties.86  Understanding that they served in a representa-
tive capacity,87 commission members tended to view their mandates as 
 
 83. Observers frequently mention the practice of certain European polities, during the 
Middle Ages, of submitting their disputes to arbitration by the Pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, 
or other sovereigns.  See, e.g., ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE, THE WORLD COURT 3 
(Elizabeth F. Read trans., 1925); HUDSON, supra note 52, at 17; MERRILLS, supra note 56, at 89; 
MORRIS, supra note 57, at 7-12; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 55, 174, 181-
82; RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxv; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE 
CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 200-10; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 97 n.1; Manfred 
Lachs, The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Time, 169 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 9, 224 (1980).  Unwilling to expose the sufficiency of their analysis to outside cri-
tique, the Pope, the Holy Roman Emperor and other sovereign arbitrators typically provided no 
reasons for their decisions, thus casting doubt on the legal basis for their awards.  See 
MERRILLS, supra note 56, at 89; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 55, 91-92; 
Abi-Saab, supra note 51, at 921-22. 
 84. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 53, at 716, 724 (using the Jay Treaty arbitrations to 
mark the point at which “international judicial organs” received the entitlement to “settle inter-
national disputes on the basis of international law,” and opining that the awards rendered by 
two of the commissions achieved an “impressive” level of quality); Shifman, supra note 53, at 
128-29 (observing that the Jay Treaty “was a milestone because it showed that quasi-judicial 
procedures applying international legal principles could be used to settle disputes between na-
tions”). 
 85. See Charney, supra note 53, at 118 (concluding that the awards issued under Article VII 
of the Jay Treaty “played an important role in the development of State Responsibility law”). 
 86. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 87. See HUDSON, supra note 52, at 19 (explaining that the practice of appointing nationals 
to joint commissions conferred a “representative capacity” on tribunal members); RALSTON, 
ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 57 (emphasizing that mixed tribunal members “were 
apt to regard themselves and be regarded by others as simply the representatives of the nations 
in dispute and therefore serving in no judicial function”). See also Schwarzenberger, supra note 
53, at 726 (opining that the legal opinions of members from two Jay Treaty commissions “were 
determined by their . . . views on the national interests of their own countries”). 
BROWER_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:14:21 PM 
2008] FUNCTIONS & LIMITS OF ARBITRATION & JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT 271 
an extension of diplomacy.88  Furthermore, while the membership of 
commissions inclined the process towards negotiation of acceptable 
outcomes,89 their rules of procedure reinforced that orientation.  For 
example, Articles VI and VII empowered their respective commis-
sions to render decisions by majority vote, but required the presence 
of at least one party-appointed member from each side to conduct 
business.90  Under these circumstances, the party-appointed members 
from either side held a collective veto, which they could exercise by 
withdrawing and bringing the proceedings to a temporary or perma-
nent halt.91  Needless to say, this arrangement encouraged a “high-
level of consensus-seeking” among tribunal members.92  Thus, al-
though they rendered awards founded on legal principles,93 these joint 
commissions worked best when their members blended the functions 
of judges and negotiators, reconciling the demands of justice with the 
expediency of compromise.94 
 
 88. See MERRILLS, supra note 56, at 89 (indicating that these “early Anglo-American 
commissions were not judicial tribunals in the modern sense, but were supposed to blend juridi-
cal with diplomatic considerations to produce . . . a negotiated settlement”); ROSENNE’S THE 
WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 2 (opining that the composition of the Jay Treaty commis-
sions contradicted “any idea of third-party settlement,” and describing the proceedings as more 
“diplomatic . . . than judicial in character”).  See also COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 226 
(explaining that in “the early days of arbitration . . . arbitrators were regarded as exercising an 
essentially diplomatic function”); RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 22-23 
(noting that mixed commissions tend to “recall their diplomatic origin and strive always to make 
a bargain between the opposite pretensions of the parties” (quoting SLAVCO STOYKOVITCH, DE 
L’AUTORITE DE LA SENTENCE ARBITRALE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 6 (1924)); R. Y. 
Hedges, The Juridical Basis of Arbitration, 1926 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 110, 113 (asserting that dur-
ing the first half of the nineteenth century, “arbitration was largely of a diplomatic character,” 
meaning that tribunals based their awards on “calculations of national interest rather than on a 
true balance of arguments”). 
 89. See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 106 (suggesting that “tribunals with a majority 
of national arbitrators are more likely to turn to compromise, whereas tribunals composed of 
non-national arbitrators are likely to operate strictly on the basis of law”); Scott Memorandum, 
supra note 79, at 28 (asserting that “the practice of arbitration since the negotiation of the Jay 
treaty in 1794” has led many to conclude that “arbitration is too often synonymous with com-
promise; that it is ‘an adjustment’ of difficulties rather than ‘a judicial decision’ of controver-
sies”). 
 90. See Jay Treaty, supra note 53, art. VI (collection of pre-war debts), art. VII (unlawful 
seizures of ships and cargoes). 
 91. See supra notes 68-69, 74-75 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Bederman, supra note 70, at 164. 
 93. COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 32; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 
53, at 2.  See also RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 56 (recognizing that one of 
the commissions’ “decisions were generally just and always well-fortified by reasoning”). 
 94. SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 3.  See also Lillich, supra note 53, at 280-81; Pinto, 
supra note 53, at 71. 
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B. The Alabama Claims: Arbitration Becomes a Judicial Process 
Despite the Jay Treaty’s revival of arbitration, many writers re-
gard the Alabama Claims as the greatest arbitration in modern his-
tory.95 Commenced under the Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871,96 
that arbitration famously sought to resolve an accumulation of claims 
alleging British violations of neutrality involving the construction of 
armed vessels for the Confederacy during the American Civil War.97  
While it sounds almost incredible to the modern ear, the volatile mix 
of British actions and U.S. recriminations brought the two states 
closer to the brink of war than at any time since 1814.98 
After years of unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a rapproche-
ment,99 the United States and Great Britain agreed to submit the Ala-
 
 95. See, e.g., BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 51; ADRIAN COOK, THE ALABAMA CLAIMS 9 
(1975); H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 9 
(1933); MORRIS, supra note 57, at 60; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 197; 
RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvii; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, 
supra note 53, at 2; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 241; Best, su-
pra note 81, at 629; Janis, supra note 53, at 14; Schwebel, supra note 53, at 364.  See also Abi-
Saab, supra note 51, at 922 (describing the Alabama Claims as the “real beginning of modern 
international arbitration, in the technical sense”). 
 96. Treaty between the United States and Great Britain.  Claims, Fisheries, Navigation of 
the St. Lawrence, & c.; American Lumber on the River St. John; Boundary, U.S.-Gr. Brit., May 
8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863 [hereinafter Treaty of Washington].  See also HUDSON, supra note 52, at 5. 
 97. COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 32; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 5; HYDE, supra 
note 57, § 564, at 120; JESSUP, supra note 58, at 2; MOORE, supra note 57, at 495-96; MORRIS, 
supra note 57, at 74; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 197; RALSTON, LAW 
AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvii; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 63; SCOTT, 
THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 241; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 8; 
Caron, supra note 79, at 9; Janis, supra note 53, at 14; Stephen M. Schwebel, The Performance 
and Prospects of the World Court, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 253, 254 (1994). 
 98. See Moore, supra note 53, at 495.  See also Cook, supra note 95, at 19; FRANK WARREN 
HACKETT, REMINISCENCES OF THE GENEVA TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION 1872: THE 
ALABAMA CLAIMS 18 (1911); Meyer, supra note 53, at 1; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 254. In 
fact, there had been a “widespread” fear that “Union victory would be followed by a war of re-
venge against Britain.”  Cook, supra note 95, at 29.  See also Meyer, supra note 53, at 2 (quoting 
Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy for the proposition that “the English . . . are more apprehensive 
of war than they are willing to confess, and hostilities may be nearer than our people suppose”). 
 99. When the U.S. minister to London made a conciliatory proposal to arbitrate the Ala-
bama Claims in 1863, the British foreign minister waited nearly two years before replying that 
“Her Majesty’s Government [were] the sole guardians of their own honor” and that he viewed 
the proposal as incompatible with the “dignity and character of the British Crown.” See JESSUP, 
supra note 58, at 3; MOORE, supra note 57, at 496.  In 1868, the new U.S. minister to London 
negotiated a plan to arbitrate the Alabama Claims.  MOORE, supra note 57, at 501-04.  See also 
COOK, supra note 95, at 51-61.  Following an intemperate speech by the chair of its Foreign Re-
lations Committee, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 44 to 1.  See COOK, supra note 95, 
at 95, 99 (describing the speech as a “dangerously exaggerated and unbalanced piece of work,” 
which dragged the dispute “back into the hysterical atmosphere of the war years”); Tom Bing-
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bama Claims to arbitration before a tribunal of five jurists, one each 
to be appointed by the President of the United States, the Queen of 
England, the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation, 
and the Emperor of Brazil.100  After conducting hearings in Geneva 
during the summer of 1872, the tribunal rendered an award in favor 
of the United States in the amount of $15,500,000,101 an enormous sum 
by prevailing standards.102  Although its party-appointed arbitrator 
submitted a lengthy and vitriolic dissent,103 the British government 
fully, if ironically, satisfied the award by tendering bonds issued by 
the U.S. government to finance its expenses during the Civil War.104 
Reviewing its significance, many writers emphasize that the Ala-
bama Claims arbitration removed a cause of war105 between two great 
powers106 with a history of difficult relations,107 thus proving that arbi-
 
ham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 12 (2005) (indicating that the 
speaker “used his customary rhetoric and invective to savage the convention”); The Geneva Ar-
bitration, and Its Results, 7 AM. L. REV. 193, 213 (1873) (opining that the speaker “expressed his 
convictions in a tone of exaggeration which is not common in the public acts of statesmen”).  See 
also MOORE, supra note 57, at 508; Bingham, supra, at 13 (describing the overwhelming vote 
against the draft treaty). 
 100. Treaty of Washington, supra note 96, art. I; COOK, supra note 95, at 185; CALEB 
CUSHING, THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 22 (1873); HUDSON, supra note 52, at 5; MOORE, su-
pra note 57, at 548, 557; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 74; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra 
note 53, at 56, 197-98; RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvii; Janis, supra 
note 53, at 14. 
 101. CUSHING, supra note 100, at 163; HACKETT, supra note 98, at 341-47; HYDE, supra note 
57, § 564, at 121; JESSUP, supra note 58, at 23-24; MOORE, supra note 57, at 658-59; MORRIS, su-
pra note 57, at 75; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 200; RALSTON, LAW AND 
PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvii; Best, supra note 81, at 629; Bingham, supra note 99, at 1; 
Janis, supra note 53, at 14. 
 102. Converted directly into real dollars, that amount exceeds $300 million.  Bingham, supra 
note 99, at 1.  Stated as a proportion of the British government’s annual budget (approximately 
5 percent), the modern equivalent approaches $300 billion.  See id. 
 103. CUSHING, supra note 100, at 128-30; HACKETT, supra note 98, at 356-57; MOORE, supra 
note 57, at 652, 659-61; Bingham, supra note 99, at 22-23; The Geneva Arbitration, and Its Re-
sults, supra note 99, at 233-34. 
 104. MOORE, supra note 57, at 665-66; Bingham, supra note 99, at 23.  See also JESSUP, supra 
note 58, at 24-25. 
 105. THOMAS BALCH, INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF ARBITRATION 24-25, 31-32 (4th ed. 
1912); SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 319. 
 106. Compare COOK, supra note 95, at 9 (describing the Union’s army as the largest “in the 
history of the world”), and CUSHING, supra note 100, at 17 (emphasizing that “[w]e had on the 
sea hundreds of ships of war or of transport; we had on land hundreds of thousands of veteran 
soldiers under arms; we had officers of land and sea, the combatants in a hundred battles”), with 
Bingham, supra note 99, at 24 (describing Great Britain as “the world’s leading nation, in the 
plentitude of its power,” at the relevant time). 
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tration could resolve controversies of the first order.108  More impor-
tantly for the development of international tribunals, Great Britain 
and the United States did not merely resort to arbitration; they al-
tered its character.  Instead of establishing a quasi-diplomatic joint 
commission, the disputing parties consented for the first time in his-
tory109 to arbitration before a panel of jurists appointed mostly by neu-
tral governments, charged with a mandate to apply specific legal 
rules, and having the capacity to transact business by majority vote.110  
In so doing, they marked a turning point in the development of inter-
national adjudication:111 from then on, the trajectory of arbitration 
shifted decisively towards a judicial model.112 
 
 107. In less than a century before the American Civil War, the United States and Great 
Britain had fought each other in two major wars.  MEYER, supra note 53, at 1; Bingham, supra 
note 99, at 1. 
 108. CUSHING, supra note 100, at 185-86; MICHAEL DUNNE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
WORLD COURT, 1920-1935, at 11-12 (1988); HYDE, supra note 57, § 564, at 121; ROSENNE’S THE 
WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 3; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, 
at 242 (quoting Professor Moore); Janis, supra note 53, at 15.  But see Caron, supra note 79, at 9 
(opining that the Alabama Claims arbitration “was somewhat exaggeratedly credited with de-
fusing the potential conflict between the United States and Great Britain”). 
  Because the three substantive rules on neutrality set forth in the Treaty of Washington 
essentially determined the question of liability in the Alabama Claims, one may say that the 
United States and Great Britain actually settled that issue by negotiation.  See HUDSON, supra 
note 52, at 106; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 95, at 151; J.L. Brierly, The Judicial Settlement of 
International Disputes, 4 J. BRIT. INST. INT’L AFF. 227, 227 (1925); Mr. Choate’s Address on the 
Anglo-American Project of International Arbitration (Oct. 5, 1907) [hereinafter Choate’s Ad-
dress of Oct. 5, 1907], reprinted in AMERICAN ADDRESSES AT THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE 
CONFERENCE 44, 49 (James Brown Scott ed., 1910) [hereinafter AMERICAN ADDRESSES].  
Thus, the arbitration served mainly to settle the amount of damages.  RALSTON, ATHENS TO 
LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 199. 
 109. See Bingham, supra note 99, at 24 (explaining the Alabama Claims arbitration’s signifi-
cance as involving “one of the very few instances in history when the world’s leading nation . . . 
has agreed to submit an issue of great national moment to the decision of a body in which it 
could be, as it was, heavily outvoted”). See also RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 
53, at 56, 197 (emphasizing the “distinctive” and “unusual” structure of the tribunal); SIMPSON 
& FOX, supra note 54, at 8 (describing the “new type of tribunal” constituted to hear the Ala-
bama Claims). 
 110. Treaty of Washington, supra note 53, arts. I, II, VI; CRAWFORD MORRISON BISHOP, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCEDURE 2 (1930); MERRILLS, supra note 56, at 91. 
 111. BISHOP, supra note 110, at 2; COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 32; MERRILLS, supra 
note 56, at 91.  See also ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 3 (opining that the 
significance of the Alabama Claims “lies in the nature of the tribunal”). 
 112. See Hedges, supra note 88, at 113 (opining that “the judicial element of arbitration may 
be said to have taken root” following the Alabama Claims arbitration). See also BROWNLIE, su-
pra note 53, at 672; COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 33; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 
10. 
BROWER_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:14:21 PM 
2008] FUNCTIONS & LIMITS OF ARBITRATION & JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT 275 
C. The Hague Peace Conferences: The PCA and Harmonization of 
Procedural Law 
In 1899, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia convened the first Hague 
Peace Conference113 with the objective of terminating or curtailing the 
European arms race,114 which had assumed monumental propor-
tions.115 Since the proposal attracted little enthusiasm among Euro-
pean governments,116 which depended on military power to perpetu-
ate colonial empires,117 Nicholas added arbitration to the conference’s 
agenda,118 which drew a more favorable response.119 
 
 113. David J. Bederman, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, in 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 53, at 9, 9; Best, supra 
note 81, at 621; Janis, supra note 53, at 15; James Brown Scott, The Work of the Second Hague 
Peace Conference, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1908); Detlev F. Vagts, The Hague Conventions and 
Arms Control, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 31, 33 (2000). 
 114. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 41; JOSEPH H. CHOATE, THE TWO HAGUE 
CONFERENCES 6 (1913); SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 42, 43; 
SCOTT, supra note 79, at 47-48; Bederman, supra note 113, at 9; Best, supra note 81, at 621; 
Amos S. Hershey, Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences, 2 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 29, 29 (1908); Scott, supra note 113, at 8; Knox Memorandum, supra note 53, at 6. See 
also Message of the Czar, Aug. 24, 1898, reprinted in DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE 
PROGRAM OF THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 1-2 (1921). 
 115. See Paul M. Kennedy, The First World War and the International Power System, INT’L 
SECURITY,  Summer 1984, at 7, 7-8 (noting that the First World War was preceded by an “arms 
race of staggering proportions,” during which “military expenditures more than doubled” in 
Germany and Austria-Hungary); Vagts, supra note 113, at 32 (describing the growing military 
budgets of major European powers from 1894 to 1913, including a 117 percent increase by Great 
Britain, a 91.5 percent increase by France, a 158 percent increase by Germany, and a 160 per-
cent increase by Austria). See also GEORGE ELIAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
15 (1971) (asserting that “after 1870, the arms race quadrupled the military expenses in the first 
ten great states in the world”); Best, supra note 81, at 621 (opining that “Europe was beginning 
to look like an armed camp”); Jörg Manfred Mössner, Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 
1907, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 671, 671 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 
1995) (observing that “[m]ilitary budgets increased enormously during the last decade of the 
19th century”). 
 116. KUEHL, supra note 53, at 44-45; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 47-48; Scott, supra note 113, at 
8. See also Best, supra note 81, at 622 (recounting that “the chancelleries of Europe handled [the 
Tsar’s invitation] like a parcel that might contain a bomb”). 
 117. See Best, supra note 81, at 619. 
 118. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 41-42; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, 
supra note 53, at 44-46; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 48; Arthur Eyffinger, Living Up to a Tradition, 
in THE HAGUE: LEGAL CAPITAL OF THE WORLD, supra note 53, at 29, 36; Scott, supra note 113, 
at 8-9. See also Circular Note of Count Mouravieff to the Diplomatic Representatives Accred-
ited to the Court at Petrograd ¶ 8 (Dec. 30, 1898), reprinted in DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE 
PROGRAM OF THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, supra note 114, at 2, 3 [hereinafter Cir-
cular Note of Count Mouravieff]. 
 119. See Scott, supra note 113, at 9 (observing that the provisions on arbitration described in 
the second circular were “much better received”). See also Instructions to the American Dele-
gates to the Hague Conference of 1899 [hereinafter Instructions to the American Delegates in 
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Because a “decided” worldwide movement already favored the 
creation of a permanent international tribunal,120 which “could not be 
ignored,”121 several delegations arrived in The Hague with instructions 
to make proposals on the topic.122  For example, the United States fa-
vored a continuously sitting international court,123 staffed by eminent 
jurists and modeled on the U.S. Supreme Court.124  The British pre-
ferred a permanent institution without a fixed bench,125 but with the 
capacity to establish tribunals quickly when disputes arose between 
states.126  Russia added a plan to make arbitration mandatory for cer-
tain categories of disputes.127  By contrast, Germany opposed most of 
the plans on practical grounds: unlike its potential adversaries, Ger-
many could mobilize its army in a matter of days,128 giving it an un-
matched capacity to launch preemptive strikes.129  Under these cir-
 
1899], in INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES TO THE HAGUE PEACE 
CONFERENCES AND THEIR OFFICIAL REPORTS 6, 8 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) [hereinafter 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES] (expressing the opinion that the proposals re-
garding arbitration seemed to “open the most fruitful field for discussion and future action”). 
 120. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 6. See also Caron, supra note 79, at 4 (referring to the 
“popular belief circulated at the end of the century that the establishment of a permanent inter-
national court would be an important step toward a world free of war”). 
 121. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 6.  See also SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 12 (“By the 
end of the nineteenth century, arbitration had become a widely spread international custom; 
and it was natural that its discussion should occupy a considerable place in the deliberations of 
the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.”). 
 122. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 6; Caron, supra note 79, at 15. 
 123. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 43; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 137; SCOTT, THE 
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 72, 278; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 52-53; Caron, 
supra note 79, at 15, 17; Instructions to the American Delegates in 1899, supra note 119, at 14-16; 
Report to the Secretary of State of the Delegates to the First Hague Conference [hereinafter Re-
port of the Delegates to the First Hague Conference], in INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN 
DELEGATES, supra note 119, at 17, 22. 
 124. MORRIS, supra note 57, at 137; Report of the Delegates to the First Hague Conference, 
supra note 123, at 22. 
 125. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 43; FREDERICK W. HOLLS, THE PEACE CONFERENCE 
AT THE HAGUE 238 (1900); MORRIS, supra note 57, at 137; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE 
CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 279; Caron, supra note 79, at 15. 
 126. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 42; HOLLIS, supra note 125, at 236; MORRIS, supra 
note 57, at 137; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 279; Hans Jonk-
man, The Role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in International Dispute Resolution, 279 
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 18 (1999). 
 127. MORRIS, supra note 57, at 138; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 
53, at 321-22; Caron, supra note 79, at 15-16; Hershey, supra note 114, at 32-33. 
 128. MORRIS, supra note 57, at 136; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 
53, at 72-73 (quoting 2 ANDREW WHITE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ANDREW DICKSON WHITE 265 
(1905)); BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE PROUD TOWER 264 (1st Ballantine Books ed. 1996). 
 129. See MEYER, supra note 53, at 16.  See also HOLLS, supra note 125, at 1, 5 (noting that 
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who died just before the first Hague Peace Conference, 
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cumstances, Germany feared that potential targets would use the 
ponderous machinery of arbitration to buy time and, thus, neutralize 
Germany’s military advantage.130 
While some have claimed that German resistance abated,131 thus 
permitting agreement on a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes,132 one might say that Germany relented only 
after it prevailed on the important points.133 As adopted, the conven-
tion created no permanent international tribunal134 and did not subject 
any category of dispute to mandatory arbitration.135  Thus, while the 
convention established the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) in The Hague,136 that institution does not represent a court in 
the traditional sense.137  It has no fixed bench.138  To the contrary, it 
 
had pursued a policy of “consistent and continually increasing preparation for war . . . and the 
avowed determination to be ready to strike the first blow . . . with greater swiftness than any 
possible opponent”). 
 130. MORRIS, supra note 57, at 136; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 
53, at 73; TUCHMAN, supra note 128, at 264; Caron, supra note 79, at 16. 
 131. RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 256; Caron, supra note 79, at 16; 
Janis, supra note 53, at 15. 
 132. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 
1779 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1899]. 
 133. See SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 309 (describing the 
concessions made to Germany as “surrender” rather than “compromise”). 
 134. Caron, supra note 79, at 16-18. 
 135. CHOATE, supra note 114, at 36; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 138-39; SCOTT, THE HAGUE 
PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 76-77, 310; Caron, supra note 79, at 16-17; Janis, supra 
note 53, at 16. 
 136. Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 132, art. 20. 
 137. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 444 (2005); BROWNLIE, supra 
note 53, at 673; CHOATE, supra note 114, at 80; ALEXANDER P. FACHIRI, THE PERMANENT 
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: ITS CONSTITUTION, PROCEDURE, AND WORK 22 (1925); 
KUEHL, supra note 53, at 46; MEYER, supra note 53, at 18; RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, 
supra note 53, at xxviii; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 281, 442; 
SHAW, supra note 53, at 953; William E. Butler, The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, in 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 53, at 43, 44; R. Floyd 
Clarke, A Permanent Tribunal of International Arbitration: Its Necessity and Value, 1 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 342, 343-44 (1907); Hershey, supra note 114, at 30; Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, 27 AM. J. INT’L L. 440, 445 (1933); Moore, supra note 53, at 498; Scott, su-
pra note 113, at 11; Louis B. Sohn, The Function of International Arbitration Today, 108 
RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 22 (1963); Mr. Choate’s Address on the American Project for a Perma-
nent Court of Arbitral Justice (Aug. 1, 1907) [hereinafter Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 
1907], reprinted in AMERICAN ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at 78, 81. 
  For almost a century, writers have repeated the clever observation that the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration is neither “permanent” nor a “court.”  COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 
35; FRANCK, supra note 53, at 17; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 8; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 137-
38; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 260; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, 
supra note 53, at 5; Bederman, supra note 113, at 10; Shabati Rosenne, The International Court 
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encompasses three elements: (1) a list of individuals nominated by 
states parties from whom they may choose arbitrators in the event of 
a dispute,139 (2) a small International Bureau or secretariat that pro-
vides registry services to ad hoc tribunals,140 and (3) a set of proce-
dural rules that apply in the absence of contrary agreements by the 
disputing parties.141  In other words, the PCA represents an optional 
facility for arbitration that states may activate as desired.142 
 
of Justice at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, in THE HAGUE: LEGAL CAPITAL OF THE 
WORLD, supra note 53, at 183, 185; Knox Memorandum, supra note 53, at 7. 
 138. Léon Bourgeois, Report on the Organisation of a Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, 1 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O. J. 33, 35 (1920); SHAW, supra note 53, at 953; Clarke, supra note 
137, at 343; Scott, supra note 113, at 11; Knox Memorandum, supra note 53, at 7. 
 139. Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 132, arts. 23-24. See also Bourgeois, supra note 
138, at 35; BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 45; BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 673; CHOATE, su-
pra note 114, at 37; COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 36; FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 22; 
FRANCK, supra note 53, at 17; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 7; 2 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 75 
(1938); JESSUP, supra note 58, at 34; FRANCES KELLOR & MARTIN DOMKE, ARBITRATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSY 44 (1944); KUEHL, supra note 53, at 46; MORRIS, supra note 
57, at 138; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 260; RALSTON, LAW AND 
PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxviii; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 5; 
SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 281, 442; SHAW, supra note 53, at 
953; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 12; Bederman, supra note 113, at 10; Clarke, supra note 
137, at 344; Hershey, supra note 114, at 30; Moore, supra note 53, at 498. 
 140. Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 132, arts. 22, 26.  See also BROWNLIE, supra note 
53, at 673; CHOATE, supra note 114, at 37-38; COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 36; HYDE, 
supra note 57, § 564, at 130; KELLOR & DOMKE, supra note 139, at 43; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD 
COURT, supra note 53, at 5; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 281; 
SHAW, supra note 53, at 953; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 13; Butler, supra note 137, at 45; 
Hudson, supra note 137, at 443; Shifman, supra note 53, at 132. 
  One may use the phrase “ad hoc tribunal” in two different senses.  First, in the context 
of international commercial arbitration, writers often use the phrase to identify tribunals not 
operating under the proprietary rules of an arbitration institution.  See, e.g., BORN, supra note 1, 
at 44; LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 32; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 47; TWEEDDALE 
& TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 62; Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor 
Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?, 12 U.C. DAVIS 
J. INT’L  L. & POL’Y 47, 54 (2005). Second, in the context of public international law, writers of-
ten use the phrase to identify tribunals that lack a permanent existence and that serve only to 
resolve a particular dispute or a series of existing disputes.  See Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, 
Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 65-68, 70-71, 73, 
75, 89, 91, 93 (2003) [hereinafter Brower, Legitimacy]; Charles N. Brower et al., The Coming 
Crisis in the Global Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT’L 414, 430 (2003). For avoidance of ambi-
guity, the author refers to the second understanding of “ad hoc tribunals.” 
 141. Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 132, arts. 30-57. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 
53, at 673; CHOATE, supra note 114, at 38; COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 36; SIMPSON & 
FOX, supra note 54, at 13; Hudson, supra note 137, at 441; Mössner, supra note 115, at 673-74, 
677; Scott, supra note 113, at 11. 
 142. AUST, supra note 137, at 444; BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 673; HUDSON, supra note 
52, at 8; SHAW, supra note 53, at 953; Hudson, supra note 137, at 445; Butler, supra note 137, at 
44. 
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When Nicholas II convened a Second Hague Peace Conference 
in 1907, the prospects for international adjudication had improved.  
For example, while arbitration had slipped onto the agenda “almost 
as an afterthought” in 1899,143 it dominated the negotiations in 1907.144  
Furthermore, when the United States renewed its efforts to establish 
a permanent international tribunal with a fixed bench,145 the proposal 
drew support even from the German delegation.146  However, the pro-
ject failed when a rift opened between large and small states on the 
principles for judicial appointments.  Whereas larger states demanded 
permanent representation on the court,147 smaller states insisted on a 
system reflecting the juridical equality of all states.148  Unable to rec-
oncile these conflicting views, negotiations for a permanent interna-
 
 143. Bederman, supra note 113, at 9.  See also MORRIS, supra note 57, at 126. 
 144. MORRIS, supra note 57, at 132-33.  See also MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT 
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 4 (1925). 
 145. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 46-47; CHOATE, supra note 114, at 77; DUNNE, supra 
note 108, at 19; FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 4; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 25; HUDSON, supra 
note 144, at 4; JESSUP, supra note 139, at 75-76, 420; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, 
supra note 53, at 129, 430, 440; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 52-53; TUCHMAN, supra note 128, at 
287; Moore, supra note 53, at 499; Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, Permanent Court of International 
Justice, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 988, 988 (Rudolph Bernhardt 
ed., 1997); Schwebel, supra note 97, at 255; Stephen M. Schwebel, Reflections on the Role of the 
International Court of Justice, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1986); Draft of an Identic Circular 
Note Proposed to and Approved by Secretary of State Knox, to be sent to the American Am-
bassadors at London, Berlin, and Paris (Nov. 25, 1912) [hereinafter Knox Circular Note], re-
printed in SCOTT, AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 18, 21; Knox 
Memorandum, supra note 53, at 8; Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Confer-
ence of 1907 [hereinafter Instructions to the American Delegates in 1907], in INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE AMERICAN DELEGATES, supra note 119, at 67, 79-80; Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 
66; Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81. 
 146. SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 129, 434; Schlochauer, 
supra note 145, at 988; Knox Circular Note, supra note 145, at 21; Scott Memorandum, supra 
note 79, at 66-67; Mr. Scott’s Report to the Conference Recommending the Establishment of a 
Court of Arbitral Justice (Oct. 16, 1907) [hereinafter Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907], re-
printed in AMERICAN ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at 112, 122; Report to the Secretary of State 
of the Delegates of the United States to the Second Hague Conference [hereinafter Report to 
the Secretary on the Second Hague Conference], reprinted in INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
AMERICAN DELEGATES, supra note 119, at 86, 135. 
 147. SCOTT, supra note 79, at 65. See also JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROJECT OF A 
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE OF JURISTS: REPORT AND COMMENTARY 29 (1920); Mössner, supra note 115, at 
676; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 255. 
 148. SCOTT, supra note 147 at 29; The Constitution of an International Court of Justice: Re-
marks by Hon. Elihu Root Before the Advisory Committee of Jurists at The Hague, June, 1920, 
15 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1921) [hereinafter The Constitution of an International Court]. 
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tional court fell short of completion in 1907.149  As a result, delegates 
concentrated on revisions to the Convention for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes,150 adjusting its provisions in light of 
experience,151 but leaving the fundamental structure untouched.152 
While some have expressed disappointment at the failure to 
achieve more at the Hague Peace Conferences153 and others have of-
fered tepid endorsements of the PCA,154 state practice suggests a 
much higher level of enthusiasm, at least until establishment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920.155  During the rele-
vant period, states concluded roughly 120 new treaties providing for 
 
 149. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, 1 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 226, 236 
(1920) (address by Baron Descamps, President of the Committee); Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 
36; BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 677; CHOATE, supra note 114, at 77-79; DUNNE, supra note 
108, at 19; FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 4; HUDSON, supra note 144, at 4; MANLEY O. HUDSON, 
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at 82 (1943); HYDE, supra 
note 57, § 572, at 140; JESSUP, supra note 139, at 420; KUEHL, supra note 53, at 104; MEYER, su-
pra note 53, at 29; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 456; SCOTT, 
supra note 147, at 13; Bederman, supra note 113, at 11; Caron, supra note 79, at 21; Moore, su-
pra note 53, at 499; Mössner, supra note 115, at 676; Knox Circular Note, supra note 145, at 21; 
Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 66. 
 150. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2199 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1907]. 
 151. SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 254; Knox Memorandum, 
supra note 53, at 6; Report to the Secretary on the Second Hague Conference, supra note 146, at 
93, 100. 
 152. Jonkman, supra note 126, at 23; Knox Memorandum, supra note 53, at 6; James Brown 
Scott, The Second Hague Conference: A Peace Conference, Address at The George Washing-
ton University (Dec. 21, 1907), reprinted in AMERICAN ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at xxxi, 
xxxviii. 
 153. Hershey, supra note 114, at 48. See also David Jayne Hill, The Net Result at The Hague, 
in  S. DOC. 60-433, at 3 (1908) (observing that “[t]he Hague Conferences have been saluted with 
contempt on the one hand, and satire on the other”); SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE 
CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 1 (indicating that the “great public” felt that the lack of 
agreements on disarmament and compulsory arbitration “involved the failure of the Confer-
ence”); Moore, supra note 53, at 498-99 (recognizing that the PCA “failed to meet the expecta-
tions which many had indulged”); Joseph H. Choate, Progress at the Second Hague Conference, 
Address to the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 24-25, 1908), reprinted in AMERICAN 
ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at xiii, xiii (lamenting the “general disposition” of journalists to 
“belittle and depreciate the work” of the Second Hague Conference). 
 154. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 673; JESSUP, supra note 58, at 34; Mr. Scott’s Address 
on the Elements Entering into the Composition of an International Court of Arbitral Justice 
(Aug. 1, 1907) [hereinafter Mr. Scott’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907], reprinted in AMERICAN 
ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at 84, 86. 
 155. See HUDSON, supra note 52, at 7 (discussing recourse to the PCA, and its decline fol-
lowing establishment of the PCIJ in 1920). 
BROWER_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:14:21 PM 
2008] FUNCTIONS & LIMITS OF ARBITRATION & JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT 281 
arbitration.156  They also brought some 14 disputes before tribunals 
constituted by the PCA,157 making that institution the center of gravity 
for arbitration among states during the first two decades of the twen-
tieth century.158 
Although it did not endure, one may attribute the PCA’s season 
of popularity to two practical, if modest, features.  First, while arbitra-
tion had been possible for over a century, the Hague Conventions 
made it simple by providing the necessary ingredients: a pool of arbi-
trators, a set of procedures, and a competent registry.159  Second, by 
supplying rules of procedure, the conventions neutralized a previous 
tendency towards “extreme informality” in arbitration,160 and initiated 
the broad harmonization161 (but not detailed standardization)162 of 
procedural rules, for which arbitration later became famous.163 
 
 156. Id.; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 7; Janis, supra note 53, at 16. See 
also CHOATE, supra note 114, at 40 (alluding to the conclusion of more than 144 “standing arbi-
tration treaties” between 1899 and 1913). 
 157. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 7; KELLOR & DOMKE, supra note 139, at 44; ROSENNE’S 
THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 7; Janis, supra note 53, at 16. 
 158. BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 673; Jonkman, supra note 126, at 26. 
 159. See WILLIAM EVANS DARBY, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 474-75 (3d ed. 1899). See 
also Hudson, supra note 137, at 459 (emphasizing the importance of the PCA’s International 
Bureau, which “has served . . . as an impartial body through which negotiations and communica-
tions may be conducted; it has offered a locus in which tribunals may have their seats; and it has 
furnished trained personnel upon which tribunals may rely”). But see SCOTT, THE HAGUE 
PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 426 (quoting Professor Asser, a founder and member 
of the PCA, for the proposition that the process was “difficult, time-consuming and expensive to 
set in motion,” at least when compared to a traditional court permanently in session). 
 160. SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 13. 
 161. Before 1899, there were no commonly accepted rules of procedure for arbitrations be-
tween states.  Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 234 (address by 
Baron Descamps, President of the Committee); BISHOP, supra note 110, at 12-13. According to 
one source, the absence of clear procedures led to fears, complications, and delays for consum-
ers of arbitration.  BISHOP, supra note 110, at 12-13. As amended in 1907, the rules of procedure 
adopted by the Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes still comprise a 
routine point of departure for drafting arbitration agreements and for framing arguments on 
disputed procedural points.  SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 53, at 13. 
 162. See HYDE, supra note 57, § 570, at 134 (emphasizing that the procedural rules “are 
mainly descriptive of the general steps to be followed”).  See also HUDSON, supra note 52, at 84 
(explaining that “[u]nlike the procedure in some national courts,” procedures before interna-
tional tribunals have not “congealed within the confines of strict and rigid rules”); Bederman, 
supra note 70, at 174 (discussing unsuccessful efforts to “standardize” the procedures of interna-
tional tribunals); Charney, supra note 53, at 125 (recounting the failed effort to promulgate a 
rigid procedural code for arbitration among states, and concluding that states prefer the flexibil-
ity traditionally afforded by arbitration). 
 163. Cf. Charles H. Brower, II, Reflections on the Road Ahead: Living with Decentralization 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (forthcoming 
2008) (asserting that the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law and increasingly 
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Nevertheless, the PCA’s growing popularity soon exposed the 
limitations of that system.  As the number of cases increased and be-
came simpler to track within a single institutional process, it became 
clear that tribunals formed by the PCA saw their mandate as resolv-
ing particular disputes, and not as developing a consistent body of ju-
risprudence for the benefit of all states.164  Under these circumstances, 
the procession of ad hoc tribunals never developed the continuity re-
quired to support an accumulation of precedent165 and, thus, to confer 
the jurisprudential benefits of stability,166 coherence167 and certainty.168  
As one prominent observer exclaimed “each case [was] decided as if 
it were an isolated problem, sporadic, never occurring before and 
never to occur again,” with the result that “Chaos” and “Chance” sat 
as umpire and arbitrator.169 
To summarize, while the Hague Peace Conferences led to the 
harmonization of procedural rules for arbitrations between states, re-
course to the PCA left the development of substantive principles in 
disarray.  The desire to remedy this flaw not only justified the pro-
 
harmonized procedural rules have marked commercial arbitration as the rare example in which 
international law and practice have established clear rules, universally and consistently enforced 
across the globe). 
 164. SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 6 (1958); Caron, supra note 79, at 13; Scott Memorandum, supra note 
79, at 25, 38, 39, 41. 
 165. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 235 (address by Baron 
Descamps, President of the Committee); Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the 
Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Feb. 10, 1944), reprinted in 39 AM. J. 
INT’L L. SUPP. 1, 34 (1945) [hereinafter Report of the Inter-Allied Committee]; BROWNLIE, supra 
note 53, at 677; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 162, 246-47; HUDSON, supra note 149, at 80; 
HUDSON, supra note 144, at 283; HYDE, supra note 57, § 572, at 138 n.7; LAUTERPACHT, supra 
note 164, at 6; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 427 (quoting Jo-
seph Choate); Clarke, supra note 137, at 345, 401; Hudson, supra note 137, at 458-59; Moore, 
supra note 53, at 499; Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 41, 43; Mr. Choate’s Address of 
Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81; Mr. Choate’s Remarks on Introducing the Proposed Court 
of Arbitral Justice (Aug. 13, 1907) [hereinafter Mr. Choate’s Remarks on the Proposed Court of 
Arbitral Justice], reprinted in AMERICAN ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at 97, 98.  See also 
RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 30; Penfield, supra note 81, at 332. 
 166. Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 35; DUNNE, supra note 108, at 19. 
 167. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 294 (7th rev. ed. 1997).  
 168. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 164, at 6.  See also Moore, supra note 53, at 499. 
 169. Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 37 (quoting Harvard Professor Eugene Wam-
baugh). See also Clarke, supra note 137, at 400 (lamenting that the “evanescent and fugitive 
character” of such tribunals led to a “great contradiction in their rulings” on nearly identical 
questions). 
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posals for a permanent tribunal in 1907,170 it also represented a princi-
pal reason for continued interest in judicial settlement through the 
end of the Great War.171 
D. The PCIJ and the ICJ: The Consistent Development of 
International Law 
Although the Hague Conferences billed arbitration as a means 
for securing peaceful settlement of disputes,172 its availability did not 
prevent Germany from exhibiting her military prowess in two World 
Wars.173  Nevertheless, the unprecedented destruction wrought by 
those conflicts174 called forth a new demand for international institu-
tions designed to prevent war,175 including a permanent court engi-
 
 170. See, e.g., Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81 (“Let us . . . seek 
to develop  . . .  a permanent court, . . .  which shall consist of the same judges,  . . . pay due heed 
to its own decisions, . . . and gradually build up a system of international law, definite and pre-
cise, which shall . . . regulate the conduct of nations.”). 
 171. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 164, at 6.  See also Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 
42-43 (quoting Elihu Root). 
 172. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 150, arts. 1, 37-38; Hague Convention of 1899, 
supra note 132, arts. 1, 20.  See also Schwebel, supra note 97, at 254 (explaining that the peace 
movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was “transfixed” with the idea 
that recourse to arbitration could prevent armed conflict). 
 173. See Moore, supra note 53, at 499 (recognizing that the PCA’s “inability to prevent the 
recurrence of war was soon demonstrated”). See also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 59 
(expressing regret that the PCA “did not avert the great conflicts of the twentieth century”). 
 174. Fought from 1914 to 1918, World War I took more lives than all wars fought from 1790 
to 1913.  Christopher M. Petras, The Use of Force in Response to Cyber-Attack on Commercial 
Space Systems—Reexamining “Self-Defense” in Outer Space in Light of the Convergence of U.S. 
Military and Commercial Space Activities, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1213, 1235 (2002). See also 
Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Cultural Value of Sexual Violence, 93 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 312, 
318 (1999) (“World War I produced destruction previously unseen and unimagined by Western 
society.”).  However, World War II became the world’s most destructive war, claiming at least 
50 to 55 million lives.  Francis A. Gabor, Qou Vadis Domine: Reflections on Individual and Eth-
nic Self-Determination Under an Emerging International Legal Regime, 33 INT’L LAW. 809, 820 
(1999); Carol D. Rasnic, Germany’s Legal Protection for Women Workers Vis-a-Vis Illegal Em-
ployment Discrimination in the United States: A Comparative Perspective in Light of Johnson 
Controls, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 415, 417 (1992). 
 175. See Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Walking an International Law Tightrope: Use of Mili-
tary Force to Counter Terrorism—Willing the Ends, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 406 (2006) (as-
serting that the destruction of World War I prompted establishment of the League of Nations as 
a means of securing international peace); Petras, supra note 174, at 1235-36 (describing the 
“immense destruction” wrought by World War I and identifying establishment of the League of 
Nations as an effort to ensure that such wars could not recur); Karin G. Tackaberry, Time to 
Stand Up and Be Counted: The Need for the United Nations to Control International Terrorism, 
ARMY LAW., July 2007, at 1, 20 (explaining that the “widespread death and destruction” of 
World War II “served as a catalyst for the creation of the UN” in order to “‘save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war’”). 
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neered to secure the peaceful settlement of international disputes.176  
As explained below, however, the legacy of that court, and of its suc-
cessor, became the consistent development of international law. 
While it technically did not establish a judicial organ for League 
of Nations, Article 14 of the Covenant instructed the organization’s 
Council to “formulate and submit to the members of the League . . . 
plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International 
Justice.”177  To that end, the Council summoned a group of distin-
guished jurists.178  Ten individuals accepted the invitation,179 thus form-
ing an Advisory Committee of Jurists consisting of five citizens from 
the so-called “Great Powers” and five citizens from smaller states.180 
From start to finish, the Committee’s work represented the direct 
continuation of efforts launched during the Second Hague Peace 
Conference.  To begin with, a substantial minority of the Committee 
had participated in the First or Second Hague Conferences, including 
Elihu Root who, as Secretary of State, had instructed the U.S. delega-
tion to seek a permanent international court in 1907.181  Furthermore, 
 
 176. See SHAW, supra note 53, at 960 (explaining that the first permanent international court 
“was intended . . . to prevent outbreaks of violence”). See also LAUTERPACHT, supra note 164, 
at 3 (describing the Court’s “primary purpose” as the maintenance of peace “in so far as this 
aim can be achieved through law”); Rosenne, supra note 137, at 191 (identifying “the avoidance 
or the settlement of disputes” as the PCIJ’s “prime objective”). 
 177. League of Nations Covenant art. 14.  See also FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 1; MEYER, 
supra note 53, at 40; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 62; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 2; Moore, supra note 
53, at 500. 
 178. FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 2; MEYER, supra note 53, at 41; Schlochauer, supra note 
145, at 989.  See also SCOTT, supra note 79, at 63; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 2-3; Moore, supra 
note 53, at 500. 
 179. JESSUP, supra note 139, at 419; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 63. 
 180. SCOTT, supra note 79, at 63. 
 181. See JESSUP, supra note 139, at 420; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 13 (both describing Root’s 
participation in the Second Hague Conference). In addition to Root, the Committee included 
Baron Edouard Descamps, who represented Belgium at the First Hague Conference, Francis 
Hagerup, who represented Norway at the Second Conference, and Arturo Ricci-Busatti, who 
had served as secretary to Italy’s delegation at the Second Conference.  Compare Bourgeois, 
supra note 138, at 36-37 (listing the individuals proposed for membership in the Committee), 
with REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 15, 205, 211 (James Brown 
Scott ed., 1917) (identifying the relevant delegates to the First and Second Hague Conferences).  
See also CALVIN DEARMOND DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE 
CONFERENCE 360 (1975) (describing Ricci-Busatti’s role). 
  The League’s Council had also extended invitations to Luis Drago, who represented 
Argentina at the Second Hague Conference, and Henri Fromageot, who represented France at 
the Second Hague Conference.  Compare Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 36-37 (listing the indi-
viduals proposed membership in the Committee), with REPORTS TO THE HAGUE 
CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, supra, at 206, 209 (identifying Drago and Fromageot as dele-
gates to the and Second Hague Conference). In the end, neither gentleman accepted the honor.  
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despite plans to meet in London, Committee members gathered in 
The Hague after the Dutch government drew their attention to the 
“undying memories” of the Peace Conferences182  and invited them to 
complete the work left unfinished in 1907. To greet Committee mem-
bers in that historic city, the League’s Council dispatched Léon Bour-
geois,183 a former French prime minister,184 the head of the French 
delegation to both Hague Conferences,185 and president of the com-
mission on pacific settlement of disputes at both Hague Confer-
ences.186  In addressing the Committee, Bourgeois called for estab-
lishment of a “true permanent court,” not controlled by the disputing 
parties but having the “mandate” and “duration” needed to establish 
a “real jurisprudence.”187  To that end, Bourgeois expressed the hope 
that Committee members would take the reports of the previous 
work in the Hague as their point of departure.188 
Heeding Bourgeois’ admonition, Elihu Root proposed a resolu-
tion identifying the acts and resolutions of the Second Hague Confer-
ence as the foundation for the Committee’s work.189  In so doing, he 
aimed to reassure observers that the Committee did not seek to ad-
vance the interests of its members or their home states, but to com-
plete an undertaking supported by the community of states.190  While 
 
See Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 226 (identifying the “mem-
bership of the Committee, after certain changes in the original list necessitated by the inability 
of some of those first appointed to serve”); BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 95 (describing the 
Committee’s final composition after some of the preliminary invitees proved “unable or unwill-
ing to serve”). 
 182. SCOTT, supra note 147, at 5. 
 183. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 96. 
 184. DUNNE, supra note 108, at 17; TUCHMAN, supra note 128, at 252. 
 185. SCOTT, supra note 147, at 6; James Brown Scott, Léon Bourgeois—1851-1925, 19 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 774, 775-76 (1925).  See also Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 
149, at 227 (address by M. van Karnebeek, Dutch Foreign Minister); TUCHMAN, supra note 128, 
at 252. 
 186. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 227 (address by M. van 
Karnebeek, Dutch Foreign Minister); SCOTT, supra note 147, at 6; Scott, supra note 185, at 775-
76. See also BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 42; TUCHMAN, supra note 128, at 257. Bourgeois 
also received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1920.  MEYER, supra note 53, at 59; Scott, supra note 185, 
at 776. 
 187. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 230 (address by M. 
Léon Bourgeois).  See also BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 96; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 7; 
Caron, supra note 79, at 26. 
 188. Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 36. 
 189. JESSUP, supra note 139, at 419-20; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 13; The Constitution of an 
International Court, supra note 148, at 1-2.  See also MEYER, supra note 53, at 41. 
 190. SCOTT, supra note 147, at 14; The Constitution of an International Court, supra note 
148, at 1-2. See also JESSUP, supra note 139, at 420 (emphasizing Root’s desire to “show the con-
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not adopting the text of Root’s proposal,191 Committee members ac-
cepted its substance,192 thus enabling completion of their task in the 
remarkably brief period of less than six weeks.193 
Following adoption of its statute and organization of its work, 
the PCIJ began to hold regular sessions in The Hague in 1922.194  Over 
the course of nearly two decades, it rendered thirty-two judgments in 
contentious cases195 and twenty-seven opinions in advisory proceed-
ings.196  While most of those decisions involved relatively technical 
questions of treaty interpretation197 and did not prevent the outbreak 
of World War II or other wars,198 they stood out for their high qual-
ity199 and for the unprecedented accumulation of practice by an inter-
national tribunal.200  Thus, the PCIJ represented a “tremendous”201 or 
“decisive”202 advance not by preventing war,203 but by producing vol-
umes of reasonably coherent jurisprudence204 that, for the first time, 
 
tinuity between [the Committee’s] labors in 1920 and the progress which had been made be-
fore”). 
 191. SCOTT, supra note 147, at 15.  See also SCOTT, supra note 79, at 64. 
 192. JESSUP, supra note 139, at 420. See also BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 97; SCOTT, su-
pra note 79, at 64; Schlochauer, supra note 145, at 990. 
 193. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 98; FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 4; MEYER, supra note 
53, at 43. 
 194. FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 18-19; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 11; Moore, supra note 53, 
at 506; Schlochauer, supra note 145, at 992.  See also Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 
IV/1 (June 12), 13 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 381, 382 (1945) [hereinafter UNCIO DOCS.]; Janis, supra note 53, at 18; 
Helmut Steinberger, Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 42, 43 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1997). 
 195. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 11; KELLOR & DOMKE, supra note 139, at 45; MALANCZUK, 
supra note 167, at 25; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 11. 
 196. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 11; MALANCZUK, supra note 167, at 25; ROSENNE’S THE 
WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 11; Janis, supra note 53, at 19; Schwebel, supra note 145, at 
1063. 
 197. ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 12, 236; Eduardo Jiménez de Aré-
chaga, The Work and Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 1947-1986, 1987 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 31. 
 198. Schwebel, supra note 97, at 257. 
 199. Schwebel, supra note 145, at 1063. See also Schwebel, supra note 97, at 257 (compli-
menting the PCIJ’s judgments for their “sound and sensible” resolution of disputes). 
 200. ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 11. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Laurent Jully, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement: Recent Trends, 48 AM. J. INT’L L. 380, 
380 (1954). 
 203. Schwebel, supra note 97, at 257. 
 204. See HUDSON, supra note 52, at 11 (“[T]he results of the Court’s work have been gener-
ally hailed with satisfaction throughout the world, and the volumes of its jurisprudence consti-
tute a notable contribution to the development of international law.”). 
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marked case law as a significant factor in the development of substan-
tive international law.205 
Although the German invasion of The Netherlands forced the 
PCIJ to suspend its work in 1940,206 the Court’s strong track record 
ensured that it emerged from World War II with its reputation largely 
intact.207  Thus, while negotiations regarding the post-war order aimed 
for replacement of the League with a more effective organization,208 
they produced an equally strong sentiment favoring retention of a 
world court based on the favorable experiences of the past.209  Al-
though some argued for direct continuation of the PCIJ so as not to 
interrupt the continuity of its jurisprudence,210 the Charter’s drafters 
elected to form a new International Court of Justice (ICJ) as one of 
the principal organs of the United Nations Organization.211 
Despite the formal inauguration of a new court, the Charter’s 
drafters sought to preserve continuity with the PCIJ at the functional 
level.212  For example, they constituted the ICJ under a Statute almost 
 
 205. See SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 19; Jully, supra note 202, at 380.  See also ELIAN, 
supra note 115, at 6 (concluding that the activity of the PCIJ “brought a significant contribution 
to the development of international law”); Schwebel, supra note 145, at 1063 (describing the 
PCIJ’s importance in terms of its significant contributions so the “progressive development of 
international law”). 
 206. UNCIO DOCS., supra note 194, at 382; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 11, 140; Manley O. 
Hudson, The Succession of the International Court of Justice to the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 569, 569 (1957). 
 207. See UNCIO DOCS., supra note 194, at 382 (recognizing that the PCIJ’s decisions “in 
several scores of cases produced a general satisfaction throughout the world”); United Nations 
Comm. of Jurists, Report of Rapporteur on Draft of Statute of an International Court of Justice 
(Apr. 25, 1945), in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: SELECTED 
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DRAFTING OF THE STATUTE 113, 113 (1946) [hereinafter 
United Nations Comm. of Jurists] (recalling that the PCIJ “had functioned for twenty years to 
the satisfaction of the litigants and that, if violence had suspended its activity, . . . th[e] institu-
tion had not failed in its task”). See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON 
THE RESULTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED 
STATES DELEGATION, THE SEC’Y OF STATE 139 (1945) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT] (describing the “unanimous agreement” that the PCIJ had “rendered effective ser-
vice and had made an excellent record”). 
 208. Schwebel, supra note 97, at 257. 
 209. Rosenne, supra note 137, at 191; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 257; Schwebel, supra note 
145, at 1063. 
 210. See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 52, at 143. See also United Nations Comm. of Jurists, su-
pra note 207, at 113 (recalling the PCIJ’s effective performance and indicating a subtle prefer-
ence for its continuation under an amended statute). 
 211. UNCIO DOCS, supra note 194, at 381, 383, 385, 387; MEYER, supra note 53, at 88. 
 212. See UNCIO DOCS, supra note 194, at 384 (emphasizing that the “creation of the new 
Court will not break the chain of continuity with the past” and listing some of the practical steps 
taken to ensure that “continuity in the progressive development of the judicial process will be 
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identical to that of its forerunner.213  Furthermore, the ICJ established 
its seat in The Hague, moving into the same facilities previously used 
by the PCIJ,214 where it employed virtually the same staff members,215 
and exercised jurisdiction under treaties that referred to the PCIJ.216  
Furthermore, when the ICJ formally inaugurated its work, the leader-
ship of the World Court did not change: Judge José Guerrero, the 
PCIJ’s last president, became the ICJ’s first president.217  From that 
time on, the ICJ has applied the PCIJ’s decisions interchangeably 
with its own,218 thus maintaining a continuous jurisprudence.219  Under 
these circumstances, observers have come to regard the two courts as 
a single organizational unit.220 
Despite the continuity of jurisprudence, observers have called at-
tention to the fact that the transition from the PCIJ to the ICJ en-
tailed a notable decline in the rate of judicial activity, which began in 
1945 and lasted for many decades.221  Thus, in the first thirty-five years 
of its existence, the ICJ rendered only twenty-six judgments in con-
 
amply safeguarded”); Schwebel, supra note 145, at 1063 (“Every effort was made to maintain 
continuity between the two courts.”).  See also REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 207, at 
140-41. 
 213. BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 678; SHAW, supra note 53, at 960; Janis, supra note 53, at 
19; Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, International Court of Justice, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1084, 1084 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995). See also MALANCZUK, supra 
note 167, at 281; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 257; Schwebel, supra note 145, at 1063. In order to 
facilitate reliance on precedents regarding application of the PCIJ’s Statute, the drafters of the 
ICJ Statute even retained the same numbering of articles.  UNCIO DOCS, supra note 194, at 
384; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 258. 
 214. MEYER, supra note 53, at 88; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 258. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 37, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [here-
inafter ICJ Statute].  See also BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 678; MALANCZUK, supra note 167, at 
281. 
 217. MEYER, supra note 53, at 92; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 258. 
 218. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 164, at 11; Janis, supra note 53, at 30. 
 219. BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 678; SHAW, supra note 53, at 960. 
 220. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 677, 678; MALANCZUK, supra note 167, at 281; 
J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 127 (4th ed. 2005); MEYER, supra note 
53, at 98; SHAW, supra note 53, at 960; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or 
Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 791, 791 (1999); Janis, supra note 53, at 19. See also UNCIO DOCS, supra note 
194, at 384 (encouraging consideration of the ICJ as “successor” to the PCIJ); REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT, supra note 207, at 141 (asserting that the “new court” effectively constitutes “only a 
‘revised court,’ the successor of the old”). 
 221. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 731 (3d ed. 1979). 
See also MERRILLS, supra note 220, at 176 (indicating that “the ICJ has heard only a trickle of 
contentious cases” since its establishment in 1945). 
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tentious cases,222 a rate of less than one per year and not comparable 
to the thirty-two judgments issued by the PCIJ in roughly half the 
time.223  Although the situation did not improve during the 1980s,224 
the following decade saw an increase in Court’s workload.225  By 
about its sixtieth anniversary, the ICJ had rendered ninety-two judg-
ments in contentious cases226 and regularly had a docket of ten or 
more pending cases,227 thus marking the busiest period in the com-
bined history of the two courts.228 
Moving from quantitative to qualitative assessments, observers 
have drawn attention to another change that accompanied the transi-
tion from the PCIJ to the ICJ.  Whereas the PCIJ’s decisions concen-
trated on relatively technical questions of treaty interpretation,229 the 
ICJ’s decisions have focused more on the application and develop-
ment of customary international law.230  Furthermore, when compared 
to its predecessor, the ICJ has addressed a greater variety of weighty 
and cutting-edge matters,231 including the use of force,232 credible alle-
 
 222. MALANCZUK, supra note 167, at 290. 
 223. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 224. See MALANCZUK, supra note 167, at 290. 
 225. One may use the publications of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel to track the growth of 
cases on the ICJ’s docket.  As of his elevation to the bench in 1981, the Court had only one ac-
tive case.  Stephen M. Schwebel, The Docket of the World Court, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1, 2 (1998) [hereinafter Schwebel, The Docket of the World Court]; Schwebel, supra note 53, at 
359.  As of 1994, the number had grown to roughly one dozen.  Schwebel, supra note 97, at 258. 
Although the number of pending cases fell to nine during 1998, it later rebounded and stood at 
twenty-three when Judge Schwebel left the bench in 2000.  Schwebel, The Docket of the World 
Court, supra, at 2; Schwebel, supra note 53, at 359. 
 226. Report of the International Court of Justice (1 Aug. 2006-31 July 2007), para. 8, U.N. 
GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. A/62/4 (Aug. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Report of the ICJ]. 
The ICJ rendered thirty of those judgments in the last ten years.  Id. 
 227. MERRILLS, supra note 220, at 176. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 694 (recogniz-
ing that “the Court has had a consistently full calendar of contentious cases” in recent years).  
As of July 31, 2007, the number of pending cases stood at twelve.  Report of the ICJ, supra note 
226, para. 9. 
 228. ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 238. 
 229. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 230. Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra note 197, at 31. 
 231. See Rosenne, supra note 137, at 202 (explaining that many cases brought before the ICJ 
“have been weightier, and of greater general importance than those brought before the Perma-
nent Court”).  See Report of the ICJ, supra note 226, para. 11 (emphasizing the “cutting-edge” 
issues raised by cases on the Court’s docket). 
 232. See, e.g., Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), at 1 
(Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2008); Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. U.K), 2004 I.C.J. 1307, 1307 
(Dec. 15); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 161 (Nov. 6), available at http://www.icj-
BROWER_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:14:21 PM 
290 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:259 
gations of genocide,233 and the cooperative exploitation of shared 
natural resources.234  Despite these new challenges and some notable 
criticisms relating to particular cases,235 observers continue to express 
a high regard for the quality of the ICJ’s work.236 
Beyond fluctuations in their activity and in the character of issues 
submitted for decision, no assessment of the PCIJ and the ICJ would 
be complete without a comparison of goals to performance.  As in all 
things, expectations tend to influence one’s conclusions.  For exam-
ple, many people expected the PCIJ and the ICJ to play leading roles 
in the maintenance of international peace and security by providing a 
substitute for armed conflict.237  Because neither Court has made sig-
nificant contributions to that idealistic goal,238 one might assess their 
combined track record in disappointing terms.  Nevertheless, one 
should recall that many have described the establishment of a con-
tinuous jurisprudence and the progressive development of interna-
tional law as important (perhaps the most important) justifications for 
establishment of the PCIJ and its successor, the ICJ.239  In this regard, 
 
cij.org/docket/files/90/9715.pdf; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 14 (June 27). 
 233. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), at 1-5 (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf. 
 234. See, e.g., Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), paras. 2-4 (Order of July 13, 
2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/11235.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
 235. See José E. Alvarez, Burdens of Proof, ASIL NEWSL. (ASIL, Washington, D.C.), 
Spring 2007, at 1, 7 (discussing the ICJ’s recent judgment in Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and concluding that “the majority of 
the ICJ’s judges appear in need of a basic course in Fact-Finding 101”). See also BROWNLIE, 
supra note 53, at 693 (listing three judgments criticized by British publicists as being “too radi-
cal”). 
 236. See Schwebel, supra note 97, at 258; Steinberger, supra note 194, at 45. 
 237. See UNCIO DOCS, supra note 194, at 393; ELIAN, supra note 115, at 5; LAUTERPACHT, 
supra note 164, at 3; SHAW, supra note 53, at 960; Rosenne, supra note 137, at 191. 
 238. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 693 (acknowledging that the Court “has not been at 
all prominent in the business of keeping the peace”); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 164, at 4 (“[I]t 
would be an exaggeration to assert that the Court has proved to be a significant instrument for 
maintaining international peace.”). See also Schwebel, supra note 97, at 257 (“[T]he hope of the 
peace movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, that international adjudication was the 
substitute for war . . . was ill-founded and unduly idealistic.”). 
 239. See FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 92; HUDSON, supra note 144, at 16; LAUTERPACHT, 
supra note 164, at 5, 6, 8; Georges Abi-Saab, The International Court as a World Court, in FIFTY 
YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 3, 9 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmau-
rice eds., 1996); Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra note 197, at 1. See also REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT, supra note 207, at 138 (“[The] International Court of Justice . . . has an important 
part to play in developing international law just as the courts of England and America have 
helped to form the common law.”); Permanent Court of Arbitration, Circular Note of the Secre-
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it bears repeating that the practice of referring to and building on past 
decisions has remained a conspicuous part of their combined work 
product,240 with the result that the two courts have established a con-
tinuous and reasonably consistent jurisprudence,241 which by all ac-
counts has made a significant contribution to the clarification and de-
velopment of international law.242 
In sum, whereas the PCA inaugurated the broad standardization 
of procedural rules for arbitration of disputes among states, the PCIJ 
and the ICJ consolidated that work and extended it to the consistent 
and progressive development of international law. 
III.  DISPUTES AMONG STATES UNDER PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL 
SETTLEMENT 
While observers have long discussed the declining stream of 
PCA arbitrations, which slowed to a trickle following inauguration of 
the PCIJ243 and, then, nearly ceased during several decades of the 
ICJ’s existence,244 Professors Gray and Kingsbury documented a 
broader drop in recourse to arbitration for inter-state disputes over 
the period from 1945 to 1990.245  During the same time, the number of 
 
tary General (Mar. 3, 1960), reprinted and translated in 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 933, 934 (1960) [here-
inafter Circular Note of the Secretary General] (discussing the “great advantages” of permanent 
international courts, including their capacity to develop a “permanent and uniform jurispru-
dence”); MERRILLS, supra note 220, at 181 (“[P]ermanent courts, with their ability to develop a 
consistent jurisprudence, may be expected to contribute more to legal progress than occasional 
arbitrations.”); Christian Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1108 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995) (“[The] basic idea under-
lying the creation of ICTs is for them to function as permanent bodies . . . capable of ensuring a 
certain degree of continuity of legal reasoning.”). 
 240. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 164, at 9, 11. 
 241. Id. at 18. 
 242. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 693; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 164, at 5; SHAW, su-
pra note 53, at 1005; Steinberger, supra note 194, at 45. 
 243. See COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 36; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 7; SHAW, supra 
note 53, at 958; Hudson, supra note 137, at 459.  See also Jonkman, supra note 126, at 26; Sohn, 
supra note 53, at 15; Sohn, supra note 137, at 1 (all describing the decline of recourse to the 
PCA starting in the 1920s). 
 244. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 673; Janis, supra note 53, at 16, 35; Jonkman, supra 
note 126, at 27-28; P.H. Kooijmans, International Arbitration in Historical Perspective: Past and 
Present (Comments on a Paper by Professor L.B. Sohn), in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: 
PAST AND PROSPECTS, supra note 53, at 23, 25; Shifman, supra note 53, at 135, 141-42. 
 245. See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 99-100. 
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international courts grew sharply,246 suggesting a nearly complete 
transition from arbitration to judicial settlement. 
Since the appearance of Gray’s and Kingsbury’s work, however, 
arbitration involving states has experienced a revival on two fronts.  
Beginning in mid-1990s, demand for the PCA’s services and those of 
its International Bureau increased dramatically.247  A decade later, the 
list of pending arbitrations hovered at ten to twelve per year, marking 
one of the busiest periods in the PCA’s history.248  In a related field,249 
the number of arbitrations brought against states under investment 
treaties also jumped from single digits to scores of pending claims.250  
While surprising to many, the popularity of arbitration for particular 
categories of disputes might not have surprised proponents of judicial 
settlement in 1907 or 1920.  As explained below, they foresaw the lim-
its of judicial settlement and, thus, contemplated a substantial role for 
 
 246. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 53, at 1011 (describing the “proliferation of judicial organs 
on the international and regional level”); D.W. Bowett, Contemporary Developments in Legal 
Techniques in the Settlement of Disputes, 180 RECUEIL DES COURS 169, 178-79 (1983-II) (recog-
nizing the appearance of “several new courts” at the international level); Caron, supra note 79, 
at 24 (mentioning the recent growth of “international adjudicative bodies”); Dupuy, supra note 
220, at 792 (referring to the “proliferation of international courts and tribunals”). 
 247. See SHAW, supra note 53, at 953-54; Jonkman, supra note 126, at 17, 29-30, 40-42; Shif-
man, supra note 53, at 141-44. 
 248. See Shifman, supra note 53, at 142. See also AUST, supra note 137, at 444. 
 249. See infra notes 281-285 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of investment 
treaty arbitration in testing and reinforcing hypotheses about the limits of judicial settlement in 
claims involving states, their sovereign acts, and the application of public international law). 
 250. In 1995, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
had five pending claims with $15 million in controversy.  Roberto Daniño, Remarks in Honor of 
Antonio R. Parra, NEWS FROM ICSID (Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Wash., D.C.), 
Apr. 26, 2005, at 12, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
ICSIDNewsLetersRH&actionVal= ShowDocument&DocId=DC4. Ten years later, the list of 
pending cases had grown to ninety with more than $25 billion in controversy.  Id.  See also MEG 
N. KINNEAR ET AL., INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO 
NAFTA CHAPTER 11, Gen. Section at 26 (2006) (comparing the total of three BIT claims regis-
tered at ICSID as of 1994 with the total of 106 treaty-based claims filed as of 2004); CAMPBELL 
MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 
5 (2007) (recounting the “exponential” growth in investment treaty arbitration from the first 
registered case in 1987 to the current total of more than 200 disputes); REDFERN & HUNTER, 
supra note 8, at 476-77 (comparing the eight ICSID cases registered and the 19 ICSID cases 
pending in 1998 with the 30 new cases registered and 63 cases pending in 2003); GUS VAN 
HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 4 n.11, 30 (2007) (comparing 
the 35 claims registered by ICSID from 1966 to 1996 with the 166 claims registered by ICSID 
from 1996 to 2005); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1521, 1538-39 (2005) (describing the “exponential explosion” of claims from a rate of one claim 
per year at ICSID during the 1980s to a rate of one or two claims per month in 2001). 
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arbitration of claims having a particular gravity or involving the dis-
cretionary allocation of valuable resources. 
When designing a Court of Arbitral Justice in 1907 and when fi-
nally establishing the PCIJ in 1920, sponsors had to define the rela-
tionship between those institutions and the machinery already sup-
plied by the PCA.  Despite calls for termination of the PCA,251 leading 
proponents of judicial settlement favored its continuation,252 going so 
far as to memorialize that objective in the Draft Convention for the 
Establishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice 253 and in the PCIJ’s 
Statute.254  Emphasizing the need for parallel institutions, they ex-
plained that judicial settlement would lend itself to adjudication of 
“purely legal” disputes,255 but that arbitration would remain a more 
suitable forum for controversies having strong “political” dimen-
sions.256  To understand the distinction, one must explore the charac-
 
 251. For example, in anticipation of the PCIJ’s inauguration, the Argentine delegation un-
successfully called for the PCA’s termination during the first Assembly of the League of Na-
tions.  HUDSON, supra note 149, at 36; Jully, supra note 202, at 381 n.3. 
 252. FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 21; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 
53, at 435-36, 442; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 41; The Constitution of an International Court, su-
pra note 148, at 4, 11; Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 84; Mr. Choate’s 
Remarks on the Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, supra note 165, at 97; Mr. Scott’s Report of 
Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 122-24 (quoting H.E. Léon Bourgeois); Letter from James 
Brown Scott, Director, Division of International Law, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, to 
H.E. Jonkheer J. Loudon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands (Jan. 12, 1914) [herein-
after Scott Letter], in SCOTT, AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 1, 3. 
 253. Draft Convention for the Establishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice art. I, reprinted 
in AMERICAN ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at 212, 212. 
 254. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 1, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S 
379 [hereinafter PCIJ Statute].  See also FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 21; Jully, supra note 202, at 
380-81 & n.2. 
 255. See SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at, 425, 436; James 
Brown Scott, The Organization of International Justice, in PEACE THROUGH JUSTICE 51, 65 
(1917) [hereinafter Scott, The Organization of International Justice]; Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 
16, 1907, supra note 146, at 114, 123 (quoting Léon Bourgeois). See also Hedges, supra note 88, 
at 110. For a description of Bouregois’ participation in the Hague Peace Conferences and in es-
tablishment of the PCIJ, see supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.  For a description of 
James Brown Scott’s participation in the Second Hague Peace Conference and in establishment 
of the PCIJ, see George A. Finch, James Brown Scott, 1866-1943, 38 AM. J. INT’L L. 183, 200-04 
(1944). 
 256. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 230 (address by Léon 
Bourgeois); SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 425 (quoting Léon 
Bourgeois); Scott, The Organization of International Justice, supra note 225, at 64, 65 (quoting 
Léon Bourgeois); Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 114 (quoting Léon 
Bourgeois); Scott Letter, supra note 252, at 3. See SCOTT, supra note 147, at 41; The Constitution 
of an International Court, supra note 148, at 11 (recounting Elihu Root’s discussion of the re-
spective functions of the PCIJ and the PCA, indicating that Root viewed judicial settlement as 
useful in resolving questions of “strict” law, and suggesting that he viewed arbitration as useful 
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ter and limits of judicial settlement contemplated at the relevant 
times. 
In 1907257 and 1920,258 supporters of an international court clearly 
favored a judicial body having the continuity required for the consis-
tent and progressive development of international law.  They also 
sought to ensure that the court’s decisions would gain worldwide ac-
ceptance.259  Therefore, in 1907 and 1920, Elihu Root and other U.S. 
officials argued that the bench of a permanent international court 
should represent the world’s major juridical systems.260 One gets the 
feeling that they meant “representation” in a literal sense: the court 
would not merely have a diverse bench, but would also have a man-
date to develop universal principles for the benefit of mankind.261 
Although the concept of a representative bench had appeared in 
the 1907 Draft Convention for the Establishment of the Court of Ar-
 
to resolve controversies based on broader principles of “justice”). See also HUDSON, supra note 
149, at 36 (quoting records from the League of Nations’ First Assembly and indicating that the 
PCA “would still have a role to fill in certain international disputes” which did not lend them-
selves to decisions “based on strict rules of law”). 
 257. Draft Convention for the Establishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice, supra note 
253, art. I; Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 35; BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 677; BUSTAMANTE, 
supra note 83, at 63; DUNNE, supra note 108, at 19; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, 
supra note 53, at 443-44; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 13; Clarke, supra note 137, at 406-07, 408; 
Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81; Mr. Choate’s Remarks on the Pro-
posed Court of Arbitral Justice, supra note 165, at 98; Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra 
note 146, at 126-27. 
 258. See Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 230 (address by 
Léon Bourgeois); HUDSON, supra note 149, at 630; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 164, at 5, 8. 
 259. See Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81. 
 260. For a discussion of the issue in 1907, see BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 46-47, 63; 
JESSUP, supra note 140, at 76; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 443; 
SCOTT, supra note 147, at 12-13; Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 82; 
Mr. Choate’s Remarks on the Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, supra note 165, at 98; Mr. 
Choate’s Remarks on the Selection of the Judges of the Court of Arbitral Justice by the Princi-
ple of Election (Sept. 18, 1907), reprinted in AMERICAN ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at 109, 
110; Mr. Scott’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 154, at 91-92; Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 
1907, supra note 146, at 127. For a discussion of the issue in 1920, see JESSUP, supra note 139, at 
421; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 62-64. 
 261. See Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81 (advocating a court 
that could “speak with the authority of the united voice of the nations” and, thus, “command 
the approval” of all nations); Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 126 (de-
scribing the indispensability of a court whose composition would reflect “the different judicial 
systems of the world, would be fitted to ascertain and develop a system of international law 
based upon a large and liberal spirit of equity in touch with the needs of the world”). See also 
SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 443 (“[A]n international court 
should represent the various juridical systems of the world, for it is only by judges trained in 
these various system[s] that we can hope to create and develop that international equity which 
would be at once the honor and the justification of the court.”). 
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bitral Justice,262 the issue became a serious point of contention among 
members of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, some of whom 
viewed it as an effort to secure permanent representation for large 
and powerful states on the bench of the PCIJ.263  However, when Root 
described his goal as enriching the range of perspectives brought to 
bear on cases before the court, the proposal received the Committee’s 
approval,264 became part of the PCIJ Statute,265 and carried over to the 
ICJ Statute.266 
In related step, the drafters of the PCIJ Statute established a sys-
tem of periodic judicial elections conducted simultaneously, but inde-
pendently, by the two principal political organs of the League of Na-
tions,267 which carried over to the ICJ Statute under the United 
Nations.268  While many have emphasized269 and even criticized270 the 
resulting politicization of elections, the process may encourage judges 
to look beyond the resolution of particular cases and to articulate le-
gal principles designed to serve the interests of all member states. 
Taken together, a representative bench and periodic elections by 
political organs tend to enlarge the range of interests that interna-
tional courts bring to bear on the decision of controversies.  To illus-
trate the point, one may compare the range of perspectives involved 
in arbitration and judicial settlement.  As ad hoc tribunals with no 
continuing existence, no affiliation with intergovernmental organiza-
tions having political mandates, and no capacity to affect the legal in-
terests of third states, arbitral tribunals may see the disputing parties 
as their sole audience, and the resolution of the particular dispute as 
their sole task.271  By contrast, as permanent tribunals with a represen-
 
 262. Draft Convention for the Establishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice, supra note 
253, art. I. 
 263. SCOTT, supra note 147, at 62-63. 
 264. Id. at 64-65. 
 265. PCIJ Statute, supra note 254, art. 9. 
 266. ICJ Statute, supra note 216, art. 9. 
 267. PCIJ Statute, supra note 254, art. 8. 
 268. ICJ Statute, supra note 216, art. 8. 
 269. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 679-80; SHAW, supra note 53, at 961; W. M. Reisman, 
The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: International Arbitration and 
International Adjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 51 (1996). 
 270. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 680; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 38-39 (quoting Mr. Jus-
tice Loder, Dutch Supreme Court); SHAW, supra note 53, at 962. 
 271. See Charney, supra note 53, at 126; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 115. See also 
Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, Permanent Court of Arbitration, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 981, 986 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1997) (indicating that arbitral tribunals 
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tative bench, organic links to intergovernmental organizations, and 
mandates to develop a jurisprudence for the benefit of all member 
states, international courts will not see the disputing parties as their 
sole audience, or resolution of the particular dispute as their sole 
task.272  As explained below, the broader orientation of judicial set-
tlement may not appeal to states for certain categories of disputes.273 
In contrast to the broad perspective of a representative bench 
elected by the international community, Léon Bourgeois identified a 
class of disputes for which all states—”big or small”—would find it 
“essential” to take a more “active part” in “choosing their judges”274 
by selecting arbitration and, thus, narrowing the tribunal’s orientation 
to focus on the interests of the disputing parties.275  According to 
Bourgeois, states would choose this path for “controversies of a po-
litical nature,” which he defined in 1907 as including “all cases of a 
peculiar gravity.”276  Somewhat later, Elihu Root indicated that judi-
cial settlement might prove impossible for issues either not governed 
by international law, or governed by principles so broad that their ap-
plication essentially required the exercise of discretion and political 
judgment.277  Likewise, when addressing the Advisory Committee of 
 
focus primarily on persuading the parties to settle their particular differences and, therefore, 
devote less attention to the application of international law). 
 272. See Abi-Saab, supra note 51, at 929-30; Abi-Saab, supra note 239, at 7; Charney, supra 
note 53, at 126; Dupuy, supra note 220, at 801-05; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 114-15; 
Reisman, supra note 269, at 52. 
 273. See Caron, supra note 79, at 27-28 (predicting that if international courts emphasized 
progressive development of the law instead of the correct resolution of particular disputes, the 
enthusiasm of “some states” to appear before them would decrease). 
 274. SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 425; Scott, The Organiza-
tion of International Justice, supra note 255, at 64-65; Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra 
note 146, at 114; Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 32 (emphasis added). 
 275. See Brierly, supra note 108, at 229 (indicating that disputing parties will choose arbitra-
tion when they “desire to subordinate questions of pure law” to the demands of the particular 
case); Charney, supra note 53, at 126 (opining that states “may have the perception” that ad hoc 
tribunals “will focus on the . . . interests of the parties before them”). See also Circular Note of 
the Secretary General, supra note 239, at 935 (recognizing that a “more restricted tribunal, on 
the constitution of which parties have decided by common accord, may more fully enjoy their 
confidence than a tribunal of fifteen judges, representing juridical systems from all over the 
world”). 
 276. SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 425; Scott, The Organiza-
tion of International Justice, supra note 255, at 64-65; Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra 
note 146, at 114; Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 32. See also Scott Letter, supra note 252, 
at 3. 
 277. Thus, in a 1915 letter to Professor Lassa Oppenheim, Root asserted: 
There can be no court without a law to guide it.  Otherwise the judges would be irre-
sponsible sovereigns.  There can be no police force without the judgments of a court to 
enforce.  Otherwise the police force would be the agent of an irresponsible majority re-
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Jurists in 1920, Bourgeois echoed the sentiment that the existence of 
“precise” and “defined” legal norms might represent a condition 
precedent for judicial settlement by permanent courts.278  Far from 
controversial, the views of Bourgeois and Root reflected prominent 
strands in contemporaneous work on the distinction between “legal” 
and “political” disputes.279  They also coincide with the assessments of 
 
ducing all sovereigns to vassalage and destroying national independence.  At the basis 
of all reform . . . lies an agreement upon certain, definite, specific rules of national con-
duct, very general and very rudimentary at first but capable of being enlarged by con-
tinual additions. 
JESSUP, supra note 139, at 375; DUNNE, supra note 108, at 20. 
 278. See Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 231 (address by M. 
Léon Bourgeois). 
 279. For example, several writers of that era defined political disputes to include controver-
sies of particular importance to the disputing states. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 95, at 139-42, 
168; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 35-36 (quoting Thomas W. Balch, XXI 
REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 181 (1914)); 1 JOHN WESTLAKE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 302-04 (2d ed. 1910); Robert Yorke Hedges, Justiciable Disputes, 22 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 560, 561 (1928). 
  Other writers defined political disputes to include controversies not governed by estab-
lished principles of international law.  HYDE, supra note 57, § 559 at 112-13; LAUTERPACHT, 
supra note 95, at 7, 51; WESTLAKE, supra, at 358; Charles G. Fenwick, The Distinction Between 
Legal and Political Questions, 18 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 44, 46 (1924); Hedges, supra note 
88, at 119.  This would include situations where the principles were so broad or so hotly con-
tested as to require tribunals to exercise a substantial degree of political judgment and discre-
tion in rendering their awards.  WESTLAKE, supra, at 363; Fenwick, supra, at 46. 
  While they used similar criteria to identify the “political” dimensions of inter-state dis-
putes, one should bear in mind that Bourgeois and his contemporaries often applied those labels 
to support different theories. For example, most writers of that era regarded “political” disputes 
as non-justiciable. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 95, at 4; Fenwick, supra, at 44; Mr. Scott’s Ad-
dress of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 154, at 88. That view has become discredited in the technical 
sense that (1) all disputes among states have a political element, and (2) international courts can 
issue legal opinions in cases having strong political overtones.  LAUTERPACHT, supra note 95, at 
153, 169-72; MERRILLS, supra note 220, at 167-170; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 102.  See 
also MALANCZUK, supra note 167, at 302.  On the other hand, that view remains valid in the 
more practical sense that legal opinions may not address the political elements of controversies, 
with the result that they may not bring the parties to closure.  MERRILLS, supra note 220, at 170-
71, 178. 
  Unlike many of his contemporaries, Bourgeois seems to have assumed that disputes 
with strong political components might be justiciable, but that the parties would consent more 
readily to adjudication in an arbitral forum.  Cf. WESTLAKE, supra, at 368 (explaining that 
“some questions of politics and honour” might be suitable for arbitration “where the questions 
are not of vital importance, and where the arbitrators are carefully chosen with a view to the 
special nature of the difference”). 
  Professor Louis Sohn later advanced the hypothesis that states would submit “political” 
disputes to arbitration and “legal” disputes to judicial settlement.  Sohn, supra note 137, at 33-
40. In so doing, he seems to have gone much farther than Bourgeois.  Whereas Bourgeois seems 
to have contemplated arbitration of legal disputes having strong political overtones, Sohn pre-
dicted that states would arbitrate claims based on interests having absolutely no foundation in 
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today’s leading writers regarding the situations in which states may 
favor arbitration over judicial settlement.280 
Thus, building on the insights of its architects, one may say that 
centralized judicial settlement possesses the capacity to make case law 
an important factor in the consistent and progressive development in-
ternational law.  Building on the same insights, however, one may 
also predict that judicial settlement will hold less appeal for states in 
disputes involving high stakes, matters of political principle, or broad 
legal standards subject to a controversial range of application.  In 
these situations, the desire to maximize control over political choices 
or to emphasize local interests can lead states to prefer arbitration, 
even if it undermines the development of international law. 
IV. INVESTMENT TREATY DISPUTES: TESTING THE LIMITS 
OF JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT 
Building on Part III, one may use the insights developed in that 
section to explain the otherwise puzzling reluctance of states to em-
brace judicial settlement in the context of investment treaty disputes.  
Though some might object to the exercise on the grounds that in-
vestment treaty arbitration falls within a procedural framework de-
signed for international commercial arbitration,281 one must recall that 
investment treaties also include a substantive component negotiated 
by states, embodied in treaties among states, and designed to regulate 
their exercise of sovereign powers.282  Thus, in substance, most in-
 
legal norms.  Id. at 36. But see Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 102-03 nn.26-27 (indicating 
that Sohn’s prediction has not found confirmation in state practice). 
 280. See Reisman, supra note 269, at 52 (emphasizing that arbitration provides states with a 
“significant degree of control over the composition of the tribunal” and asserting that “for cer-
tain sensitive cases, the assurance of this control over the tribunal’s membership is an important 
factor in the decision to accede to arbitration”). Cf. MERRILLS, supra note 220, at 319 (explain-
ing that that adjudication becomes attractive “where there is broad agreement about the rele-
vant law,” but that it becomes “totally unsuitable for disputes in which there is fundamental dis-
agreement about what the law is, or should be”). 
 281. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 65; Charles H. Brower, II, Beware the Jab-
berwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 465, 467, 473-76 (2002); Charles 
H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 72-74 (2001) [hereinafter Brower, Empire Strikes Back]; Katia Yannaca-
Small, Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Overview, Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, Working Papers on Int’l Investment No. 2006/1, 
para. 1, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/59/36052284.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Improving the 
System]. 
 282. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim 
Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1389-90 
(2003). See also MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 6-7; VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 6; 
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vestment treaty arbitrations resemble classic inter-state disputes be-
cause they encompass claims against states involving their sovereign 
activities and the application of public international law.283 
According to some, investment treaty arbitrations do not just re-
semble but, in fact, constitute traditional inter-state disputes because 
the treaties create no substantive rights for investors, but simply in-
vest them with the procedural capacity to enforce the obligations 
owed to their home states.284  While the author does not subscribe to 
that view, the point remains that one can draw fair comparisons be-
tween the substance of investment treaty disputes and the substance 
of traditional inter-state disputes.  Given the resemblance and the 
tendency of states to treat the two categories as functional equiva-
lents,285 examination of state practice regarding investment disputes 
may prove useful in testing and reinforcing the insights developed in 
Part III. 
When discussing investment disputes, one should recall that most 
of the roughly 2,500 investment treaties entail bilateral arrangements 
between capital-exporting states and capital importing states.286  To 
 
Brower, supra note 163; Bernardo M. Cremades & David J.A. Cairns, The Brave New World of 
Global Arbitration, 2 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 173, 183 (2002); Franck, supra note 140, at 69. 
 283. See Zachary Docuglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 2003 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 185 (recognizing that one cannot treat the liabilities imposed by invest-
ment tribunals as mere civil or private wrongs because the obligations stem from treaty provi-
sions, and proposing to treat investment disputes as a sub-system of state responsibility, which 
shares many of the rules contained in the inter-state system of state responsibility). One should, 
however, recognize that the resemblance to inter-state disputes does not extend to the narrow 
category of investment claims brought under the so-called “umbrella clauses” of certain treaties, 
which arguably empower investors to bring treaty claims for what would otherwise constitute 
mere contractual disputes.  See R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 1008 
(2005); MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 92, 111, 115-17; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra 
note 8, at 498-99; NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, 
POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 234-40 (2005). 
 284. See Loewen Final Award, supra note 16, para. 233, 42  I.L.M. 811, 848-49 (2003); 
Amended Memorandum of Fact and Law para. 67, Attorney General of Canada v. S.D. Myers, 
Inc., No. T-225-01 [2001] F.C. 317 (Can.), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/assets/trade 
agreementsaccordscommerciaux/pdfs/Myersamend.pdf; Petitioner’s Outline of Argument ¶¶ 
72-73, In re Arbitration Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of NAFTA Between Metalclad Corp. & 
United Mexican States [2001] BCSC 664 (Can.); Transcript of Proceedings, In re Metalclad, su-
pra, at 61, http://www.international.gc.ca/as-sets/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/pdfs/ 
trans-19fe.pdf; J. Christopher Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 433, 444 n.48 (2002).  But see Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production 
Co., [2006] Q.B. 432, 450 (Eng. & Wales); MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 63-64; Doug-
las, supra note 283, at 168, 182, 184. 
 285. See Douglas, supra note 283, at 153, 163. 
 286. Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the Interna-
tional Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 193, 194-95 (2001). See also 
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promote the flow of capital from “North” to “South,”287 these treaties 
provide substantive and procedural safeguards against harmful meas-
ures directed at foreign investors by the governments of host states.  
Substantively, most investment treaties prohibit: (1) expropriation of 
investments without compensation based on market value;288 (2) dis-
crimination in the form of treating foreign investors less favorably 
than local investors (national treatment) or investors from third states 
(MFN treatment);289 and (3) denials of “fair and equitable treat-
ment.”290  Though less common worldwide, U.S. and Canadian trea-
ties also emphasize the restriction of “performance requirements,” 
which force investments to serve the interests of host states, for ex-
ample by exporting a percentage of products or by achieving a certain 
level of domestic content.291 Procedurally, most investment treaties se-
cure these obligations by empowering investors to bring claims for al-
leged treaty violations before ad hoc arbitral tribunals formed under 
 
Jeswald Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Impact on 
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L LAW. 655, 656 (1990). 
 287. See Brower & Steven, supra note 286, at 194-95 (noting that “the overwhelming major-
ity of BITs to date have been North to South”). 
 288. See Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPA) 
(2004), art. 13, http://www.international.gc.ca/assets/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/pdfs/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf; Dutch Model Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments [hereinafter Dutch Model BIT], art.6, reprinted in 
MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 423, 425; German Model Treaty Concerning the En-
couragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2005) [hereinafter German Model 
BIT], art. 4(2), reprinted in MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 417, 418; United Kingdom 
Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2005) [hereinafter U.K. 
Model BIT], art. 5, reprinted in MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 379, 381; United States 
Model BIT (2004), art. 6, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/ 
Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf. See also BISHOP ET AL., supra note 283, at 1009, 
1109-33; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 265-313, 316-19; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra 
note 8, at 493-96; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 200-12; M. SORNARAJAH, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 239-46 (2d ed. 2004); TWEEDDALE & 
TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 470. 
 289. See Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 288, arts. 3-4; Dutch Model BIT, supra note 288, 
art. 3(2); German Model BIT, supra note 288, arts. 3(1)-(2); U.K. Model BIT, supra note 288, 
art. 3; United States Model BIT, supra note 288, arts. 3-4. See also BISHOP ET AL., supra note 
283, at 1008-09, 1133-65; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 251-57; REDFERN & HUNTER, 
supra note 8, at 496-97; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 225-34; SORNARAJAH, supra 
note 288, at 233-35, 236-37; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 470. 
 290. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 288, arts. 5(1)-(2); Dutch Model BIT, supra note 
288, art. 3(1); German Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 2(2); U.K. Model BIT, supra note 288, 
art. 2(2); United States Model BIT, supra note 288, arts. 5(1)-(2). See also BISHOP ET AL., supra 
note 283, at 1007-08, 1010-48; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 226-47; REDFERN & 
HUNTER, supra note 8, at 489-92; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 212-24. 
 291. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 288, art. 7; United States Model BIT, supra note 
288, art. 8.  See also SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 237-38. 
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the ICSID Convention,292 the ICSID Additional Facility Rules,293 or 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.294 
As should be manifest to informed observers, investment treaty 
arbitration thus proceeds under a system redolent of the PCA.295  Like 
the PCA, the ICSID system essentially comprises a list of arbitra-
tors,296 a small secretariat that provides registry services to ad hoc tri-
bunals,297 and a set of procedural rules.298  Like the PCA during its sea-
 
 292. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 288, art. 27(1)(a); Dutch Model BIT, supra note 288, 
art. 9; German Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 11 (Model I); U.K. Model BIT, supra note 288, 
art. 8 [Preferred]; United States Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 24(3)(a). See also LEW ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 768; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 193 n.19; SORNARAJAH, supra 
note 288, at 251; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 471; Douglas, supra note 283, 
at 157; Franck, supra note 250, at 1541; Franck, supra note 140, at 54. 
The “ICSID Convention” means the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention], which creates a mechanism for the arbitration of investment 
disputes brought against a state party by nationals of another state party. 
 293. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 288, art. 27(1)(b); U.K. Model BIT, supra note 288, 
art. 8(2)(a) [Alternative]; United States Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 24(3)(b). See also 
TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 472; Douglas, supra note 283, at 157. 
The ICSID Additional Facility Rules provide a mechanism by which the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes can administer arbitrations that fall outside the scope 
of the ICSID Convention because either the state party to the dispute or the investor’s home 
state has not ratified the ICSID Convention.  See Int’l Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disps. [ISCID], Additional Facility Rules, art. 2(a), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/ICSID/AdditionalFacilityRules.jsp; LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 803; VAN HARTEN, su-
pra note 250, at 35. 
 294. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 288, art. 27(1)(c); U.K. Model BIT, supra note 288, 
art. 8(2)(c) [Alternative]; United States Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 24(3)(c). See also 
RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 193 n.19; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, 
at 471; Douglas, supra note 283, at 158; Franck, supra note 250, at 1541; Franck, supra note 140, 
at 54. 
 295. See COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 60 (drawing a loose comparison between the 
PCA and ICSID in the sense that both encompass mechanisms designed to facilitate arbitration 
and conciliation). 
 296. See ICSID Convention, supra note 292, arts. 12-16. See also Paul E. Comeux & N. 
Stephan Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Stabalization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 1, 22 (1994); W. Michael Reisman, Control Mechanisms in International Dispute Reso-
lution, 2 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 129, 132 (1994); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 258 n.388 (1988) [hereinafter Vande-
velde, BIT Program]; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Reassessing the Hickenlooper Amendment, 29 
VA. J. INT’L L. 115, 164 n.233 (1988) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Reassessing Hickenlooper]. 
 297. See ICSID Convention, supra note 292, arts. 9-11. See also Brower, Empire Strikes 
Back, supra note 281, at 79; Clyde C. Pearce & Jack J. Coe, Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA 
Chapter 11: Some Pragmatic Reflections upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 311, 321 (2000); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1024-25 (2000); J. Christopher 
Thomas, Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 1999 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 99, 121. 
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son of popularity,299 ICSID has represented a center of gravity for ar-
bitration of claims against states at the end of one century and the be-
ginning of the next.300  Just as states continued to arbitrate substantial 
numbers of disputes outside the PCA framework even during its sea-
son of popularity,301 investors continue to bring a substantial minority 
of claims outside the ICSID framework.302  Just as the growing num-
ber of PCA arbitrations raised concerns about the inability of ad hoc 
tribunals to promote the consistent development of international 
law,303 the recent proliferation of investment treaty claims before ad 
hoc tribunals has unveiled a similar lack of consistency304 and called 
 
 298. See ICSID Convention, supra note 292, arts. 36-55. See also Vandevelde, BIT Program, 
supra note 296, at 258 n.388; Vandevelde, Reassessing Hickenlooper, supra note 296, at 164 
n.233. 
 299. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Franck, supra note 140, at 88 n.156; Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating 
Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, 
Empirically Evaluating Claims]; Franck, supra note 250, at 1542 n.78; Eric Gottwald, Leveling 
the Playing Field: Is It Time For a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 247 n.45, 273 (2007); Salacuse, supra note 16, 
at 149. See also TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 451 (“[A]rbitration under the 
auspices of ICSID is one of the most common features for the settlement of investment dis-
putes.”). 
 301. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 7; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 7. 
 302. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims, supra note 300, at 39-49; Franck, supra note 
250, at 1542 n.78. See also Luke Eric Peterson, Investment Treaty News: 2006-A Year in Review 
2-3 (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. 2007), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/ 
itn_year_review_2006.pdf (indicating that investors have submitted a majority of new invest-
ment treaty claims to ICSID over the past twenty years, but also reporting that 2006 marked a 
shift, with 15 new claims submitted to ICSID and 21 new claims submitted to arbitration in 
other venues). 
 303. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. 
 304. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 202; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 
25-26, 489; José E. Alvarez, The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime, 99 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 94, 97 (2005); Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 140, at 66-68; Franck, supra note 
140, at 59-69; Franck, supra note 250, at 1558-82; Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Se-
crets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 301, 340, 347-52 (2004); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Annulment of ICSID 
Awards in Contract and Treaty Arbitrations: Are There Differences?, in ANNULMENT OF ICSID 
AWARDS 189, 219-21 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds., 2004); Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Multilateral Corporations: Balancing Rights with Responsibilities, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
3, 51 (2007); Gebriel Egli, Comment, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s Inconsistent Applica-
tion of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1045, 
1064-80 (2007); Johanna Kalb, Comment, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179, 186-204 (2005); Louis T. Wells, Letter to the Editor, Private Justice Sys-
tem Can only Survive if Parties Consider It Just, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at 12. See also 
Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 1, 68 (2006) (recalling the tendency of scholars to “denounce the inconsistency of ar-
bitral decisions in matters of foreign investment”); Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the 
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forth a literature that questions the legitimacy of a legal process 
marked by conflicting outcomes in similar cases.305  Just as a popular 
movement sought a permanent international tribunal to avoid the vi-
cissitudes of ad hoc arbitration before the PCA,306 a rich vein of schol-
arship now encourages the inauguration of an appellate body or other 
permanent court to reduce the heterogeneity of outcomes in invest-
ment treaty disputes.307  At first and second glance, the congruence 
between past and present seems almost startling. 
Despite the robust sense of déjà vu, the lines of experience main-
tain their parallel orientation only until the critical endpoint, where 
they diverge along remarkably different vectors.  Whereas the arbi-
 
(Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345, 380 (2007) 
(noting the “difficulty of adopting consistent decisions in investment treaty arbitration”). 
 305. See Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 140, at 52-53, 66-68; Franck, supra note 140, at 59-
67; Franck, supra note 250, at 1582-87. See also Jack J. Coe, Transparency in the Resolution of 
Investor-State Disputes—Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1339, 1353 n.80 (2006) (“Large quantities of ink and paper have been devoted to the question of 
the ‘legitimacy’ of the investor-state dispute process.”); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Foreword to Sy-
posium on Romancing the Foreign Investor: BIT by BIT, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 4 
(2005) (recalling “[c]oncerns about the legitimacy of the process and the quality and predictabil-
ity of the jurisprudence” in investment treaty arbitration); Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Con-
trol in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014, 1015-16 (2007) (recognizing 
that the stability and predictability of tribunal decisions affect the perceived legitimacy of inter-
national investment law); Nick Ranieri & James R. Holbein, Balancing Investors’ Rights with 
Public Policy in the NAFTA Context, in NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, 
Booklet C.19.3, at 11 (Nick Ranieri & James R. Holbein eds., 2007) (describing the role of un-
predictability in creating a legitimacy crisis for NAFTA’s investment chapter). 
 306. See supra notes 170-71, 187, 257-58 and accompanying text. 
 307. VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 180-84; Frederick M. Abbott, The Political Economy 
of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of North American In-
tegration, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 308 (2000); Coe, supra note 282, at 1451-52; 
William S. Dodge, International Decision: Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 910, 918 
(2001); Franck, supra note 250, at 1610, 1617-25; David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for 
Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 39, 40 (2006) [hereinafter Gantz, Appellate Mechanism]; David A. Gantz, The 
Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 762-63 (2004); Garcia, supra note 304, at 367; Barton 
Legum, Trends and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, 19 ARB. INT’L 143, 147 (2003); 
Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora’s Box? Private Remedies for Foreign Investors Under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 77, 123 
(2000); Stiglitz, supra note 304, at 14, 53-54; Jeffrey T. Cook, The Evolution of Investment-State 
Dispute Resolution in NAFTA and CAFTA: Wild West to World Order, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1085, 
1125-30 (2007); Erin E. Gleason, International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We so Afraid of?, 7 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 269, 277-86 (2007); Kalb, supra note 304, at 219-20; Jessica S. Wiltse, 
Comment, An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism in the Free Trade Area of the Americas: Les-
sons from NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1145, 1190 (2003); R. Doak Bishop, The 
Case for an Appellate Panel and Its Scope of Review, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., Apr. 2005, at 8, 
10; Wells, supra note 304, at 12. 
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tration of disputes among states crept slowly but surely along a path 
towards judicial settlement, investment treaty disputes appear 
unlikely to follow that course.  In fact, surveys conducted by ICSID308 
and the OECD309 reveal that states have little interest in pursuing a 
single permanent appellate body for investment treaty arbitration.  
Thus, despite commentary recommending judicial settlement as the 
foundation for consistent development of international investment 
law, states seem content to forego that route even if it means the per-
petuation of conflicting decisions and a commensurate sacrifice of le-
gitimacy. 
While it may seem puzzling in light of history and foolish in light 
of the lost opportunity for development of coherent jurisprudence in 
a field that craves certainty,310 the reluctance to embrace judicial set-
tlement of investment disputes might not have surprised Léon Bour-
geois and his contemporaries.  As explained above, they predicted 
that states would continue to prefer arbitration for disputes having 
strong political dimensions.311  Applying the criteria suggested by 
Bourgeois and his contemporaries, one can easily identify the strong 
political elements embedded in most investment disputes.  Many 
claims put hundreds of millions of dollars in controversy.312  Some 
claims essentially threaten to bankrupt states following periods of 
 
 308. See ICSID, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations 4 (May 12, 2005), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052505-sgmanual.pdf (referring to a dis-
cussion paper that raised the possibility of establishing an appellate mechanism, but explaining 
that most members of ICSID’s Administrative Council regarded the undertaking as “prema-
ture”). See also Gantz, Appellate Mechanism, supra note 307, at 40 (describing the status of 
ICSID’s proposal as “subsequently recanted and now in limbo”). 
 309. See OECD, Improving the System, supra note 281, paras. 3, 28, 56 (referring to discus-
sions within the OECD’s Investment Committee regarding the advantages and disadvantages of 
establishing an appellate mechanism, but explaining that consultations “produced no consen-
sus”). 
 310. See Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Trea-
ties, 39 INT’L LAW. 87, 104 (2005) (explaining that stability and predictability of legal require-
ments represent issues of fundamental importance to foreign investors who commit significant 
capital resources to their host states for a period of years or decades).  See also Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (“[O]rderliness and predictability [are] essential to 
any international business transaction.”); Fernando R. Téson, The Kantian Theory of Interna-
tional Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 77 (1992) (“[I]nternational business transactions require sta-
bility and predictability to be successful.”). 
 311. See supra notes 256, 274-80 and accompanying text. 
 312. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims, supra note 300, at 57-58; Salacuse, supra note 
16, at 141-42. See also LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 763 (explaining that investment disputes of-
ten place “remarkable” amounts in controversy); Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment 
Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 165 (2007) (referring to a 
“litigation explosion” involving “billions of dollars”). 
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economic and political turmoil.313  Virtually all involve points of prin-
ciple that have long supplied the foundation for conflict and discord314 
from Carlos Calvo,315 to Cordell Hull,316 to the New International Eco-
nomic Order.317 
Despite the temptation to regard some of the underlying debates 
as ancient history, the fact remains that today’s investment disputes 
continue to raise fundamental points of principle because their legal 
framework emerged from the crucible of existential (and sometimes 
unresolved) conflicts about decolonization, industrialization, socialist 
 
 313. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraor-
dinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bi-
lateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 309-11 (2008). See also VAN HARTEN, supra 
note 250, at 7 (explaining that a single award against the Czech Republic roughly equalled the 
state’s entire health-care budget); Salacuse, supra note 16, at 142 (explaining that investment 
treaty awards may prove “onerous” in relation to the budgets and financial resources of devel-
oping states).  Even when successful, the defense of investment treaty claims can place serious 
pressure of the national budgets of many states.  See VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 123 n.13 
(indicating that the cost of defending a single claim consumed roughly half of the respondent 
state’s annual budget for the department of justice).  See also Salacuse, supra note 16, at 145-46. 
According to one study, states should expect to pay for the defense of unsuccessful claims be-
cause tribunals generally decline to shift the costs of legal representation in investment treaty 
disputes.  See Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims, supra note 300, at 69 (concluding that tri-
bunals declined to shift responsibility for legal fees in forty-one out of fifty-four awards). 
 314. Many standard works emphasize the intensity of debates, which began in the nine-
teenth century and continued through much of the twentieth century, concerning the existence 
and scope of customary international law rules governing the protection of foreign investments.  
See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 7, 204, 216-17; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, 
at 153-71. See also BISHOP ET AL., supra note 283, at 2-6. 
 315. Argentine jurist and diplomat Carlos Calvo articulated the doctrine that foreign inves-
tors should enjoy no right to better treatment than their local counterparts.  See BISHOP ET AL., 
supra note 283, at 3; KINNEAR ET AL., supra note 250, Gen. Section at 24; REDFERN & HUNTER, 
supra note 8, at 474; SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 38 & n.9; VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, 
at 17 & n.28. See also Amos S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 26 
(1907).  Despite strong opposition from capital-exporting states, the Calvo Doctrine attracted 
widespread support throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia.  BISHOP ET AL., supra note 
283, at 3; SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 38. 
 316. The so-called “Hull Doctrine” emerged from a famous exchange of letters, in which 
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull asserted, and his Mexican counterpart rejected, the propo-
sition that international law requires “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation for the 
nationalization of foreign investment property.  RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 158; 
SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 38 & n.8; VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 91 & n.120. 
 317. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. 
Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974). See gen-
erally JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-
SOUTH DEBATE (1977). See also SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 1, 212, 270 (describing the 
United Nations General Assembly’s adoption of several resolutions “calling for the establish-
ment of a New International Economic Order, the aim of which was to ensure fairness in trade 
to developing countries as well as control over the process of foreign investment”). 
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revolution, nationalism, racism, protection of the environment, the 
rise of multinational corporations, and the emergence of non-
governmental organizations as direct participants in the international 
legal process.318  Furthermore, even among the inner core of capital-
exporting states, the recent Dubai ports fiasco suggests the capacity of 
foreign investment to stir powerful emotions more likely to demand 
political solutions than consistent application of universal rules.319  
Viewed in this light, investment disputes tend to entail the gravity 
thought to infuse controversies with a strong political dimension.320 
Turning to a second hallmark of political disputes, one should 
observe that many principles of international investment law lack a 
clear, detailed, and universally accepted content.321  For example, as 
recently as 1964, the United States Supreme Court implied that it 
could not identify a prohibition on uncompensated takings of invest-
ment property under customary international law.322  More recently, a 
 
 318. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 1, 22, 26, 36, 66-67, 74, 77-81, 86; VAN HARTEN, 
supra note 250, at 8-9, 14, 44. 
 319. In early 2006 Dubai Ports World, a state-controlled company from the United Arab 
Emirates, proposed to make a corporate acquisition that would have given it control over leases 
to manage cargo terminals at six U.S. seaports.  In the emotionally charged atmosphere of the 
so-called “Global War on Terror,” the prospect of a state-owned Arab company managing local 
port facilities triggered political furor in the United States.  Although the Executive Branch 
previously approved the transaction as required by law, Republican and Democratic members 
of Congress united in a bipartisan effort to scuttle the deal.  See David S. Cloud, Port Deal’s 
Collapse Stirs Fears of Repercussions in Mideast Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006,  at A10; David 
S. Cloud & David E. Sanger, Dubai Company Delays New Role at Six U.S. Ports, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 24, 2006, at A1; Carl Hulse, G.O.P. Leaders Vowing to Block Ports Agreement, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A1; Carl Hulse, In Break with White House, House Panel Rejects Port 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A20; Carl Hulse & David E. Sanger, Coast Guard Had Con-
cerns About Ports Deal, Papers Show, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at A15; Simon Romero & 
Heather Thomas, A Ship Already Sailed; America Ceded Its Seaport Terminals to Foreigners 
Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at C1; David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company 
Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at A1. 
  One commentator found it “hard to imagine a more ignorant, bogus, xenophobic, [and] 
reckless debate than the one indulged in by both Republicans and Democrats around this ques-
tion of whether an Arab-owned company might oversee loading and unloading services in some 
U.S. ports.”  Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Dubai and Dunces, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at 
A27. 
 320. See LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 763 (indicating that the issues raised by investment 
disputes often have “considerable political implications”); Salacuse, supra note 16, at 141 (ex-
plaining that investor-state disputes are “political in nature,” that they “often become highly 
politicized,” and that “it is the political dimension of such conflicts that primarily preoccupy 
host government officials”). 
 321. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 218-19 (describing the failure to reach mul-
tilateral consensus on substantive principles). 
 322. In applying the so-called “act of state doctrine,” the Supreme Court reviewed the lack 
of a consistent or generalized state practice on compensation for the expropriation of foreign 
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series of negotiations for multilateral treaties on foreign investment 
have collapsed without reaching agreement, including serious efforts 
by OECD members,323 WTO members,324 and states within the 
Americas.325  Thus, from the multilateral perspective, doubt and con-
troversy remain the emblems most associated with discussions regard-
ing the international legal obligations of states with respect to foreign 
investment.326 
While capital-exporting states have established some governing 
principles for investment disputes327 by concluding roughly 2,500 bi-
 
investments, and opined that there are “few if any issues in international law today on which 
opinion seems to be so divided.”  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-30 
(1964). Scholars have interpreted that statement to recognize the unsettled character of custom-
ary international law with respect to the treatment of foreign investment.  See David A. Gantz, 
Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 651, 715 & n.337 (2001); Jordan J. Paust, Customary 
International Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
301, 318 n.81 (1999); Stephen M. Schwebel, Investor-State Disputes and the Development of In-
ternational Law: The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary International Law, 
98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 27, 27 (2004). 
 323. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 219; SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 3, 291-
92, 297; VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 21-22; Peter T. Muchlinkski, The Rise and Fall of the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, 34 INT’L  LAW. 1033, 1048-49 (2000). Ac-
cording to one observer, the failure of negotiations within the OECD “illustrates that even de-
veloped states may disagree on . . . the law of foreign investment.”  SORNARAJAH, supra note 
288, at 32. 
 324. SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 28, 32, 36, 73; VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 22-23.  
See also Gantz, Appellate Mechanism, supra note 307, at 71. Although the WTO system includes 
an Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, that instrument deals only with the nar-
row issue of investment measures that may disrupt trade in goods (i.e., a limited range of per-
formance requirements).  SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 2-3 n.2, 303; VAN HARTEN, supra 
note 250, at 21 n.55. 
 325. See Gantz, Appellate Mechanism, supra note 307, at 46-47 & n.31 (noting that problems 
have led to suspension of negotiations regarding the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 
describing the prospects of their conclusion as “increasingly remote,” and opining that extension 
of the agreement to investment “is even more remote”); Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A 
World Investment Court, AM. LAW., Summer 2004 (FOCUS EUROPE), available at 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/inv-estmentcourt04.html (referring to the stalled 
negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas). 
 326. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 1 (“Few areas of international law attract as much 
controversy as the law relating to foreign investment.”). 
 327. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 17 (“States have entered into investment 
treaties precisely in order to remedy perceived gaps . . . in the protection afforded by customary 
international law in the field of the treatment of aliens.”); Salacuse, supra note 286, at 659-60 
(describing the absence of generally accepted principles under customary international law, the 
failure to conclude multilateral treaties, and the consequent reliance on bilateral treaties to es-
tablish substantive rules for the protection of foreign investment). 
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lateral treaties328 on broadly similar terms,329 those instruments express 
many commitments at such a high level of indeterminacy,330 and the 
rules of treaty interpretation provide so little concrete guidance,331 
that they leave unresolved the essentially political tasks of specifying 
obligations and, thus, allocating potentially tremendous risks between 
foreign investors and their host states.332  Because investment treaties 
thus tend to delay the allocation of obligations and risks until the 
point of adjudication, they inevitably require tribunals to exercise 
substantial amounts of discretion and political judgment.333 
Bearing in mind the issues in controversy and the tasks assigned 
to tribunals, the reluctance of states to embrace judicial settlement of 
investment disputes begins to make sense.  Because investment dis-
putes raise grave issues and because they require tribunals to exercise 
discretion in allocating tremendous risks, they teem with the political 
elements that Bourgeois predicted would make judicial settlement an 
unappealing option for states.  Furthermore, in acting as Bourgeois 
predicted by rebuffing calls for judicial settlement of investment dis-
putes, states have tacitly reinforced his views on its functions and lim-
its under public international law: while states appreciate the value of 
judicial settlement in promoting the consistent and progressive devel-
opment of international law, they may assign greater value to arbitra-
tion’s capacity to focus on the immediate needs of parties locked in 
disputes over grave issues or the discretionary allocation of valuable 
rights. 
 
 328. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 5; Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of 
International Investment Law, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 155, 156 (2007); Stephan W. Schill, 
Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic 
of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 76 (2007); Anthony C. Sinclair, The Substance of 
Nationality Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 20 ICSID REV. FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT L.J. 357, 357 (2005). 
 329. See BISHOP ET AL., supra note 283, at 1, 8; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 5; 
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 489; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 192; SHAW, 
supra note 53, at 747-48; SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 217; Douglas, supra note 283, at 159; 
Franck, supra note 250, at 1529; Franck, supra note 140, at 86; Schwebel, supra note 53, at 365. 
 330. See Ari Afilalo, Meaning Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-) Construction of 
NAFTA Chapter 11, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 279, 297-302 (2005); Brower, Legitimacy, supra 
note 140, at 59-63; Gottwald, supra note 300, at 259-60; Ranieri & Holbein, supra note 305, at 
11; Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the 
Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 953, 959-62 (2007). 
 331. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 68. 
 332. See id. at 203 (“[T]he appearance of virtual unanimity . . ., which is gleaned from a 
comparison of the language of the multitude of treaties, masks an absence of any kind of settled 
agreement over content.”). 
 333. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 122. 
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CONCLUSION 
Most observers have examined the relationship between arbitra-
tion and judicial settlement from the perspective of international 
commercial disputes among private parties.  In that context, they 
have emphasized the celebrated shift from judicial settlement to arbi-
tration.  Unfortunately, the predominance of that narrative has 
eclipsed an important countertrend.  For disputes among states in-
volving their sovereign activities and the application of public interna-
tional law, one may document a conscious shift from arbitration to 
judicial settlement.  By contrasting these two phenomena and by in-
troducing the development of state practice with respect to invest-
ment disputes, one emerges with a more refined understanding of the 
functions and limits of arbitration and judicial settlement under pri-
vate and public international law. 
For international commercial disputes among private parties, ar-
bitration promotes neutrality by guaranteeing access to dispute set-
tlement on a level playing field, familiar and suitable for use by all 
parties.  However, because arbitration depends on the consent of the 
disputing parties, it remains vulnerable to sabotage, with the result 
that judicial settlement continues to play a vital role in providing as-
sistance at the junctures most likely to witness procedural collapse.  In 
other words, judicial settlement provides the coercion that guarantees 
the integrity of the arbitral process. 
For inter-state disputes involving sovereign activities and the ap-
plication of public international law, states often favor judicial settle-
ment because it promotes the consistent development of international 
law.  However, the emphasis on systematic development of jurispru-
dence means that judicial settlement may not address or resolve the 
political dimensions of cases involving grave issues or the discretion-
ary allocation of valuable rights.334  As suggested by the architects of 
judicial settlement and reinforced by state practice, states may prefer 
to limit the range of interests brought to bear on the decision of such 
matters by selecting arbitration—even if that means sacrificing stabil-
ity, coherence, and certainty in development of the law. 
 
 
 334. See MERRILLS, supra note 220, at 170-71, 178-79 (emphasizing that legal opinions may 
not address the political elements of controversies, with the result that they may not bring the 
parties to closure). 
